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The Experience Of Past Ages May Inform Us, That When The Circumstances Of A People Render Them Distressed, Their Rulers Generally Recur To Severe, Cruel, And Oppressive Measures. Instead Of Endeavoring To Establish Their Authority In The Affection Of Their Subjects, They Think They Have No Security But In Their Fear.

-Alexander Hamilton

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The Experience Of Past

Alexander Hamilton

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The Experience Of Past Ages May Inform Us, That When The Circumstances Of A People Render Them Distressed, Their Rulers Generally Recur To Severe, Cruel, And Oppressive Measures. Instead Of Endeavoring To Establish Their Authority In The Affection Of Their Subjects, They Think They Have No Security But In Their Fear.

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The Powers Contained In A Constitution...ought To Be Construed Liberally In Advancement Of The Public Good.

The True Principle Of Government Is This - Make The System Compleat In Its Structure; Give A Perfect Proportion And Balance To Its Parts; And The Powers You Give It Will Never Affect Your Security.

It's Not Tyranny We Desire; It's A Just, Limited, Federal Government.

A Government, The Constitution Of Which Renders It Unfit To Be Trusted With All The Powers Which A Free People Ought To Delegate To Any Government, Would Be An Unsafe And Improper Depositary Of The National Interests.

There Was A Time When We Were Told . . . That A Sense Of Common Interest Would Preside Over The Conduct Of The Respective Members...this Language At The Present Day Would Appear As Wild As That Great Part Of What We Now Hear From The Same Quarter Will Be Thought, When We Shall Have Received Further Lessons From That Best Oracle Of Wisdom, Experience.

Wisdom Experience

The Only Constitutional Exception To The Power Of Making Treaties Is, That It Shall Not Change The Constitution.… On Natural Principles, A Treaty, Which Should Manifestly Betray Or Sacrifice Primary Interests Of The State, Would Be Null.

That Experience Is The Parent Of Wisdom Is An Adage The Truth Of Which Is Recognized By The Wisest As Well As The Simplest Of Mankind.

The Practice Of Arbitrary Imprisonments Have Been, In All Ages, The Favorite And Most Formidable Instruments Of Tyranny.

Men Often Oppose A Thing Merely Because They Have Had No Agency In Planning It, Or Because It May Have Been Planned By Those Whom They Dislike.

And As The Vicissitudes Of Nations Beget A Perpetual Tendency To The Accumulation Of Debt, There Ought To Be In Every Government A Perpetual, Anxious, And Unceasing Effort To Reduce That, Which At Any Times Exists, As Fast As Shall Be Practicable Consistently With Integrity And Good Faith.

I Have A Tender Reliance On The Mercy Of The Almighty, Through The Merits Of The Lord Jesus Christ. I Am A Sinner. I Look To Him For Mercy; Pray For Me.

One Great Error Is That We Suppose Mankind More Honest Than They Are.

The Truth Is, After All The Declamations We Have Heard, That The Constitution Is Itself, In Every Rational Sense, And To Every Useful Purpose, A Bill Of Rights.

Learn To Think Continentally.

In The General Course Of Human Nature, A Power Over A Man's Subsistence Amounts To A Power Over His Will.

To Judge From The History Of Mankind, We Shall Be Compelled To Conclude, That The Fiery And Destructive Passions Of War, Reign In The Human Breast, With Much More Powerful Sway, Than The Mild And Beneficent Sentiments Of Peace.

A Fondness For Power Is Implanted In Most Men, And It Is Natural To Abuse It When Acquired.

If It Be Said That The Legislative Body Are Themselves The Constitutional Judges Of Their Own Powers, And That The Construction They Put Upon Them Is Conclusive Upon The Other Departments, It May Be Answered, That This Cannot Be The Natural Presumption, Where It Is Not Be Collected From Any Particular Provisions In The Constitution.

It Has Been Observed, [that For The Federal Government] To Coerce The States Is One Of The Maddest Projects That Was Ever Devised.

It Is A General Principle Of Human Nature, That A Man Will Be Interested In Whatever He Possesses, In Proportion To The Firmness Or Precariousness Of The Tenure By Which He Holds It; Will Be Less Attached To What He Holds By A Momentary Or Uncertain Title, Than To What He Enjoys By A Durable Or Certain Title; And, Of Course, Will Be Willing To Risk More For The Sake Of The One, Than For The Sake Of The Other.

Government Is Frequently And Aptly Classed Under Two Descriptions-a Government Of Force, And A Government Of Laws; The First Is The Definition Of Despotism-the Last, Of Liberty.

[w]e Must Extend The Authority Of The Union To The Persons Of The Citizens - The Only Proper Objects Of Government.

The Safety Of A Republic Depends Essentially On The Energy Of A Common National Sentiment; On A Uniformity Of Principles And Habits; On The Exemption Of The Citizens From Foreign Bias And Prejudice; And On That Love Of Country Which Will Almost Invariably Be Found To Be Closely Connected With Birth, Education And Family.

Bias And Prejudice

It May Be Said That The Power Of Preventing Bad Laws Includes That Of Preventing Good Ones; And May Be Used To The One Purpose As Well As To The Other. But This Objection Will Have Little Weight With Those Who Can Properly Estimate The Mischiefs Of That Inconstancy And Mutability In The Laws, Which Form The Greatest Blemish In The Character And Genius Of Our Governments.

The Liberty Of The Press Consists In The Right To Publish With Impunity Truth With Good Motives For Justifiable Ends, Though Reflecting On Government, Magistracy, Or Individuals.

[imeachable Conduct Is] Misconduct By Public Men, Or, In Other Words, From The Abuse Or Violation Of Some Public Trust.

To Watch The Progress Of Such Endeavors Is The Office Of A Free Press. To Give Us Early Alarm And Put Us On Our Guard Against Encroachments Of Power. This Then Is A Right Of Utmost Importance, One For Which, Instead Of Yielding It Up, We Ought Rather To Spill Our Blood.

If The Exercise Of Power Of Internal Taxation By The Union Should Be Discovered On Experiment To Be Really Inconvenient, The Federal Government May Then Forbear The Use Of It . . .

[t]he Present Constitution Is The Standard To Which We Are To Cling. Under Its Banners, Bona Fide Must We Combat Our Political Foes - Rejecting All Changes But Through The Channel Itself Provides For Amendments.

I Propose . . . . The Conformity Of The Proposed Constitution To The True Principles Of Republican Government.

Republican Government

Would There Not Be The Greatest Reason To Apprehend, That Error In The First Sentence Would Be The Parent Of Error In The Second Sentence? That The Strong Bias Of One Decision Would Be Apt To Overrule The Influence Of Any New Lights, Which Might Be Brought To Vary The Complexion Of Another Decision? Those, Who Know Any Thing Of Human Nature, Will Not Hesitate To Answer These Questions In The Affirmative.

There Is Perhaps, Nothing More Likely To Disturb The Tranquillity Of Nations, Than Their Being Bound To Mutual Contributions For Any Common Object That Does Not Yield An Equal And Coincident Benefit. For It Is An Observation As True, As It Is Trite, That There Is Nothing Men Differ So Readily About As The Payment Of Money.

When A Government Betrays The People By Amassing Too Much Power And Becoming Tyrannical, The People Have No Choice But To Exercise Their Original Right Of Self-defense — To Fight The Government.

To Model Our Political System Upon Speculations Of Lasting Tranquility, Is To Calculate On The Weaker Springs Of The Human Character.

In This Distribution Of Powers The Wisdom Of Our Constitution Is Manifested. It Is The Province And Duty Of The Executive To Preserve To The Nation The Blessings Of Peace. The Legislature Alone Can Interrupt Those Blessings, By Placing The Nation In A State Of War.

Distribution Of Power

There Are Still To Be Found Visionary Or Designing Men, Who Stand Ready To Advocate The Paradox Of Perpetual Peace Between The States, Though Dismembered And Alienated From Each Other.... The Genius Of Republics, Say They, Is Pacific; The Spirit Of Commerce Has A Tendency To Soften The Manners Of Men, And To Extinguish Those Inflammable Humours Which Have So Often Kindled Into Wars. Commercial Republics, Like Ours, Will Never Be Disposed To Waste Themselves In Ruinous Contentions With Each Other. They Will Be Governed By Mutual Interest, And Will Cultivate A Spirit Of Mutual Amity And Concord.

Mutual Interest

Would They Not Fear That Citizens Not Less Tenacious Than Conscious Of Their Rights Would Flock From The Remotest Extremes Of Their Respective States To The Places Of Election, To Overthrow Their Tyrants, And To Substitute Men Who Would Be Disposed To Avenge The Violated Majesty Of The People?

This Balance Between The National And State Governments Ought To Be Dwelt On With Peculiar Attention, As It Is Of The Utmost Importance. It Forms A Double Security To The People. If One Encroaches On Their Rights They Will Find A Powerful Protection In The Other. Indeed, They Will Both Be Prevented From Overpassing Their Constitutional Limits By A Certain Rivalship, Which Will Ever Subsist Between Them.

Happy Will It Be For Ourselves, And Most Honorable For Human Nature, If We Have Wisdom And Virtue Enough To Set So Glorious An Example To Mankind!

The Increasing Remoteness Of Consanguinity Is Everyday Diminishing The Force Of The Family Compact Between France And Spain. And Politicians Have Ever With Great Reason Considered The Ties Of Blood As Feeble And Precarious Links Of Political Connection.

If The End Be Clearly Comprehended Within Any Of The Specified Powers, And If The Measure Have An Obvious Relation To That End, And Is Not Forbidden By Any Particular Provision Of The Constitution, It May Safely Be Deemed To Come Within The Compass Of The National Authority.

Let Experience, The Least Fallible Guide Of Human Opinion, Be Appealed To For An Answer To These Inquiries.

There Is A Contagion In Example Which Few Men Have Sufficient Force Of Mind To Resist.

That Instability Is Inherent In The Nature Of Popular Governments, I Think Very Disputable … A Representative Democracy, Where The Right Of Election Is Well Secured And Regulated & The Exercise Of The Legislature, Executive, And Judiciary Authorities, Is Vested In Select Persons, Chosen Really And Not Nominally By The People, Will In My Opinion Be Most Likely To Be Happy, Regular And Durable.

There Are Respectable Individuals, Who From A Just Aversion To An Accumulation Of Public Debt, Are Unwilling To Concede To It Any Kind Of Utility, Who Can Discern No Good To Alleviate The Ill With Which They Suppose It Pregnant; Who Cannot Be Persuaded That It Ought In Any Sense To Be Viewed As An Increase Of Capital Lest It Should Be Inferred, That The More Debt The More Capital, The Greater The Burthens The Greater The Blessings Of The Community.

When Men, Engaged In Unjustifiable Pursuits, Are Aware That Obstructions May Come From A Quarter Which Bare Apprehension Of Opposition From Doing What They Would With Eagerness Rush Into If No Such External Impediments Were To Be Feared.

In Testimony Of Their Respect For The Patriot Of Incorruptible Integrity, The Soldier Of Approved Valour The Statesman Of Consummate Wisdom; Whose Talents And Virtues Will Be Admired By Grateful Posterity Long After This Marble Shall Have Mouldered Into Dust.

This Position Will Not Be Disputed So Long As It Is Admitted That The Desire Of Reward Is One Of The Strongest Incentives Of Human Conduct, Or That The Best Security For The Fidelity Of Mankind Is To Make Their Interest Coincide With Their Duty. Even The Love Of Fame, The Ruling Passion Of The Noblest Minds... Would On The Contrary Deter Him From The Undertaking, When He Foresaw That He Must Quit The Scene Before He Could Accomplish The Work.

Here Sir, The People Govern.

Representatives

[t]hough Individual Oppression May Now And Then Proceed Fro The Courts Of Justice, The General Liberty Of The People Can Never Be Endangered From That Quarter . . .

The Reasonableness Of The Agency Of The National Courts In Cases In Which The State Tribunals Cannot Be Supposed To Be Impartial, Speaks For Itself. No Man Ought Certainly To Be A Judge In His Own Cause, Or In Any Cause In Respect To Which He Has The Least Interest Or Bias.

Though A Wide Ocean Separates The United States From Europe, Yet There Are Various Considerations That Warn Us Against An Excess Of Confidence Or Security.

The Variety Of More Minute Interests, Which Will Necessarily Fall Under The Superintendence Of The Local Administrations . . . Cannot Be Particularized Without Involving A Detail Too Tedious And Uninteresting To Compensate For The Instruction It Might Afford.

The Prosecution [of Impeachments], Will Seldom Fail To Agitate The Passions Of The Whole Community, And To Divide It Into Parties More Or Less Friendly Or Inimical To The Accused. The Subjects Of Its Jurisdiction Are Those Offenses Which Proceed From The Misconduct Of Public Men, Or, In Other Words, From The Abuse Or Violation Of Some Public Trust, And They Relate Chiefly To Injuries Done Immediately To The Society Itself.

The Representatives Of The People, In A Popular Assembly, Seem Sometimes To Fancy That They Are The People Themselves, And Betray Strong Symptoms Of Impatience And Disgust At The Least Sign Of Opposition From Any Other Quarter; As If The Exercise Of Its Rights, By Either The Executive Or Judiciary, Were A Breach Of Their Privilege And An Outrage To Their Dignity.

We Are Now Forming A Republican Government. Real Liberty Is Never Found In Despotism Or The Extremes Of Democracy, But In Moderate Governments.

But Might Not His [the President's] Nomination Be Overruled? I Grant It Might, Yet This Could Only Be To Make Place For Another Nomination By Himself. The Person Ultimately Appointed Must Be Object Of His Preference, Though Perhaps Not In The First Degree. It Is Also Not Very Probable That His Nomination Would Often Be Overruled.

The Same Rule That Teaches The Propriety Of A Partition Between The Various Branches Of Power, Teaches Us Likewise That This Partition Ought To Be So Contrived As To Render The One Independent Of The Other.

The Experience Of Treaties Being Broken With Impunity Provide An Afflicting Lesson To Mankind How Little Dependence Is To Be Placed On Treaties Which Have No Other Sanction Than The Obligations Of Good Faith; And Which Oppose General Considerations Of Peace And Justice To The Impulse Of Any Immediate Interest And Passion.

By A Steady Adherence To The Union We May Hope, Erelong, To Become The Arbiter Of Europe In America, And To Be Able To Incline The Balance Of European Competitions In This Part Of The World As Our Interest May Dictate.

This [a State Militia System] Appears To Me The Only Substitute That Can Be Devised For A Standing Army, And The Best Possible Security Against It, If It Should Exist.

Second Amendment

Right To Bear Arms

Man Is Very Much A Creature Of Habit. A Thing That Rarely Strikes His Senses Will Generally Have But Little Influence Upon His Mind. A Government Continually At A Distance And Out Of Sight, Can Hardly Be Expected To Interest The Sensations Of The People. The Inference Is, That The Authority Of The Union, And The Affections Of The Citizens Towards It, Will Be Strengthened Rather Than Weakened By Its Extension To What Are Called Matters Of Internal Concern.

Hard Words Are Very Rarely Useful. Real Firmness Is Good For Every Thing. Strut Is Good For Nothing.

What Plan For The Regulation Of The Militia May Be Pursued By The National Government Is Impossible To Be Foreseen...the Project Of Disciplining All The Militia Of The United States Is As Futile As It Would Be Injurious If It Were Capable Of Being Carried Into Execution... Little More Can Reasonably Be Aimed At With The Respect To The People At Large Than To Have Them Properly Armed And Equipped ; And In Order To See That This Be Not Neglected, It Will Be Necessary To Assemble Them Once Or Twice In The Course Of A Year.

As To Religion A Moderate Stock Will Satisfy Me. She Must Believe In God And Hate A Saint.

Nobody Expects To Trust His Body Overmuch After The Age Of Fifty.

Allow A Government To Decline Paying Its Debts And You Overthrow All Public Morality-you Unhinge All The Principles That Preserve The Limits Of Free Constitutions. Nothing Can More Affect National Prosperity Than A Constant And Systematic Attention To Extinguish The Present Debt And To Avoid As Much As Possibly The Incurring Of Any New Debt.

War, Like Most Other Things, Is A Science To Be Acquired And Perfected By Diligence, By Perserverance, By Time, And By Practice.

The Power Of Creating New Funds Upon New Objects Of Taxation, By Its Own Authority, Would Enable The National Government To Borrow As Far As Its Necessities Might Require.

Necessity, Especially In Politics, Often Occasions False Hopes, False Reasonings, And A System Of Measures, Correspondingly Erroneous.

The Republican Principle Demands That The Deliberate Sense Of The Community Should Govern The Conduct Of Those To Whom They Intrust The Management Of Their Affairs; But It Does Not Require An Unqualified Complaisance To Every Sudden Breeze Of Passion Or To Every Transient Impulse Which The People May Receive From The Arts Of Men, Who Flatter Their Prejudices To Betray Their Interests.

For My Part, I Sincerely Esteem The Constitution, A System Which Without The Finger Of God, Never Could Have Been Suggested And Agreed Upon By Such A Diversity Of Interests.

[e]very Act Of A Delegated Authority, Contrary To The Tenor Of The Commission Under Which It Is Exercised, Is Void. No Legislative Act, Therefore, Contrary To The Constitution, Can Be Valid. To Deny This, Would Be To Affirm, That The Deputy Is Greater Than His Principal; That The Servant Is Above His Master; That The Representatives Of The People Are Superior To The People Themselves; That Men Acting By Virtue Of Powers, May Do Not Only What Their Powers Do Not Authorize, But What They Forbid.

As The Duties Of Superintending The National Defense And Of Securing The Public Peace Against Foreign Or Domestic Violence Involve A Provision For Casualties And Dangers To Which No Possible Limits Can Be Assigned, The Power Of Making That Provision Ought To Know No Other Bounds Than The Exigencies Of The Nation And The Resources Of The Community.

Domestic Violence

It Is A Singular Advantage Of Taxes On Articles Of Consumption That They Contain In Their Own Nature A Security Against Excess. They Prescribe Their Own Limit, Which Cannot Be Exceeded Without Defeating The End Purposed - That Is, An Extension Of The Revenue.

A Promise Must Never Be Broken.

Divide Et Impera Must Be The Motto Of Every Nation That Either Hates Or Fears Us.

That This Gentleman [president John Adams] Ought Not To Be The Object Of The Federal Wish, Is, With Me, Reduced To Demonstration. His Administration Has Already Very Materially Disgraced And Sunk The Government. There Are Defects In His Character Which Must Inevitably Continue To Do This More And More. And If He Is Supported By The Federal Party, His Party Must In The Issue Fall With Him.

We Must Make The Best Of Those Ills Which Cannot Be Avoided.

States, Like Individuals, Who Observe Their Engagements, Are Respected And Trusted: While The Reverse Is The Fate Of Those Who Pursue An Opposite Conduct.

The Awful Discretion, Which A Court Of Impeachments Must Necessarily Have, To Doom To Honor Or To Infamy The Most Confidential And The Most Distinguished Characters Of The Community, Forbids The Commitment Of The Trust To A Small Number Of Persons.

The Experience Of Past Ages May Inform Us, That When The Circumstances Of A People Render Them Distressed, Their Rulers Generally Recur To Severe, Cruel, And Oppressive Measures. Instead Of Endeavoring To Establish Their Authority In The Affection Of Their Subjects, They Think They Have No Security But In Their Fear.

The Means Ought To Be Proportioned To The End; The Persons From Whose Agency The Attainment Of Any End Is Expected Ought To Possess The Means By Which It Is To Be Attained.

Nothing Can Be More Evident, Than That An Exclusive Power Of Regulating Elections For The National Government, In The Hands Of The State Legislatures, Would Leave The Existence Of The Union Entirely At Their Mercy . . . . It Is To Little Purpose To Say That A Neglect Or Omission Of This Kind [not Letting The Feds Have Elections], Would Be Unlikely To Take Place. The Constitutional Possibility Of The Thing, Without An Equivalent For The Risk, Is An Unanswerable Objection.

It Is Of The Nature Of War To Increase The Executive At The Expense Of The Legislative Authority.

Schemes To Subvert The Liberties Of A Great Community Require Time To Mature Them For Execution.

It May Be Laid Down As A General Rule, That Their Confidence In And Obedience To A Government, Will Be Commonly Proportioned To The Goodness Or Badness Of Its Administration . . . . Various Reasons Have Been Suggested In The Course Of These Papers, To Induce A Probability That The General Government Will Be Better Administered Than The Particular Governments.

If We Set Out With... A Scrupulous Regard To The Constitution, The Government Will Acquire A Spirit And A Tone Productive Of Permanent Blessings To The Community. If On The Contrary,... The Constitution Is Slighted, Or Explained Away, Upon Every Frivolous Pretext, The Future Of Government Will Be Feeble, Distracted And Arbitrary. The Rights Of The Subjects Will Be The Sport Of Every Party Vicissitude. There Will Be No Settled Rule Of Conduct, But Everything Will Fluctuate With The Alternate Prevalency Of Contending Factions.

In The Usual Progress Of Things, The Necessities Of A Nation In Every Stage Of Its Existence Will Be Found At Least Equal To Its Resources.

The Laws Of Certain States . . . Give An Ownership In The Service Of Negroes As Personal Property . . . . But Being Men, By The Laws Of God And Nature, They Were Capable Of Acquiring Liberty - And When The Captor In War . . . Thought Fit To Give Them Liberty, The Gift Was Not Only Valid, But Irrevocable.

The Fabric Of American Empire Ought To Rest On The Solid Basis Of The Consent Of The People. The Streams Of National Power Ought To Flow From That Pure, Original Fountain Of All Legitimate Authority.

And It Proves, In The Last Place, That Liberty Can Have Nothing To Fear From The Judiciary Alone, But Would Have Everything To Fear From Its Union With Either Of The Other Departments.

Executive Power

It Has Been Observed That A Pure Democracy If It Were Practicable Would Be The Most Perfect Government. Experience Has Proved That No Position Is More False Than This. The Ancient Democracies In Which The People Themselves Deliberated Never Possessed One Good Feature Of Government. Their Very Character Was Tyranny; Their Figure Deformity.

Democracies Have

It Is An Unquestionable Truth, That The Body Of The People In Every Country Desire Sincerely Its Prosperity. But It Is Equally Unquestionable That They Do Not Possess The Discernment And Stability Necessary For Systematic Government. To Deny That They Are Frequently Led Into The Grossest Of Errors, By Misinformation And Passion, Would Be A Flattery Which Their Own Good Sense Must Despise.

The Citizens Of America Have Too Much Discernment To Be Argued Into Anarchy. And I Am Much Mistaken, If Experience Has Not Wrought A Deep And Solemn Conviction In The Public Mind, That Greater Energy Of Government Is Essential To The Welfare And Prosperity Of The Community

As Riches Increase And Accumulate In Few Hands . . . The Tendency Of Things Will Be To Depart From The Republican Standard.

A Fondness For Power Is Implanted In Most Men, And It Is Natural To Abuse It When Acquired. This Maxim, Drawn From The Experience Of All Ages, Makes It The Height Of Folly To Intrust Any Set Of Men With Power Which Is Not Under Every Possible Control; Perpetual Strides Are Made After More As Long As There Is Any Part Withheld.

The Art Of Reading Is To Skip Judiciously.

The Principal Purposes To Be Answered By Union Are These The Common Defense Of The Members; The Preservation Of The Public Peace As Well Against Internal Convulsions As External Attacks; The Regulation Of Commerce With Other Nations And Between The States; The Superintendence Of Our Intercourse, Political And Commercial, With Foreign Countries.

There Is One Transcendant Advantage Belonging To The Province Of The State Governments . . . -i Mean The Ordinary Administration Of Criminal And Civil Justice.

Measures Which Serve To Abridge The Free Competition Of Foreign Articles, Have A Tendency To Occasion An Enhancement Of Prices.

The History Of Ancient And Modern Republics Had Taught Them That Many Of The Evils Which Those Republics Suffered Arose From The Want Of A Certain Balance, And That Mutual Control Indispensable To A Wise Administration. They Were Convinced That Popular Assemblies Are Frequently Misguided By Ignorance, By Sudden Impulses, And The Intrigues Of Ambitious Men; And That Some Firm Barrier Against These Operations Was Necessary. They, Therefore, Instituted Your Senate.

It Was Remarked Yesterday That A Numerous Representation Was Necessary To Obtain The Confidence Of The People. This Is Not Generally True. The Confidence Of The People Will Easily Be Gained By A Good Administration. This Is The True Touchstone.

Government Implies The Power Of Making Laws. It Is Essential To The Idea Of A Law, That It Be Attended With A Sanction; Or, In Other Words, A Penalty Or Punishment For Disobedience.

If The Maintenance Of Public Credit, Then, Be Truly Important, The Next Enquiry Which Suggests Itself Is, By What Means It Is To Be Effected? The Ready Answer To Which Question Is, By Good Faith, By A Punctual Performance Of Contracts. States, Like Individuals, Who Observe Their Engagements, Are Respected And Trusted: While The Reverse Is The Fate Of Those Who Pursue An Opposite Conduct.

It Is A General Principle Of Human Nature, That A Man Will Be Interested In Whatever He Possesses, In Proportion To The Firmness Or Precariousness Of The Tenure By Which He Holds It.

The Local Interest Of A State Ought In Every Case To Give Way To The Interests Of The Union. For When A Sacrifice Of One Or The Other Is Necessary, The Former Becomes Only An Apparent, Partial Interest, And Should Yield, On The Principle That The Smaller Good Ought Never To Oppose The Greater Good.

It Is Evident From The State Of The Country, From The Habits Of The People, From The Experience We Have Had On The Point Itself, That It Is Impracticable To Raise Any Very Considerable Sums By Direct Taxation.

Of All The Cares Or Concerns Of Government, The Direction Of War Most Peculiarly Demands Those Qualities Which Distinguish The Exercise Of Power By A Single Hand. The Direction Of War Implies The Direction Of The Common Strength; And The Power Of Directing And Employing The Common Strength, Forms A Usual And Essential Part In The Definition Of The Executive Authority.

Of Those Men Who Have Overturned The Liberties Of Republics, The Greatest Number Have Begun Their Career By Paying An Obsequious Court To The People, Commencing Demagogues And Ending Tyrants.

If Duties Are Too High, They Lessen The Consumption; The Collection Is Eluded; And The Product To The Treasury Is Not So Great As When They Are Confined Within Proper And Moderate Bounds. This Forms A Complete Barrier Against Any Material Oppression Of The Citizens By Taxes Of This Class, And Is Itself A Natural Limitation Of The Power Of Imposing Them.

It Is Far More Rational To Suppose That The Courts Were Designed To Be An Intermediate Body Between The People And The Legislature, In Order, Among Other Things, To Keep The Latter Within The Limits Assigned To Their Authority.

Safety From External Danger Is The Most Powerful Director Of National Conduct. To Be More Safe, [nations] At Length Become Willing To Run The Risk Of Being Less Free.

In A Government Framed For Durable Liberty, Not Less Regard Must Be Paid To Giving The Magistrate A Proper Degree Of Authority, To Make And Execute The Laws With Rigour, Than To Guarding Against Encroachments Upon The Rights Of The Community. As Too Much Power Leads To Despotism, Too Little Leads To Anarchy, And Both Eventually To The Ruin Of The People.

The President, And Government, Will Only Control The Militia When A Part Of Them Is In The Actual Service Of The Federal Government, Else, They Are Independent And Not Under The Command Of The President Or The Government. The States Would Control The Militia, Only When Called Out Into The Service Of The State, And Then The Governor Would Be Commander In Chief Where Enumerated In The Respective State Constitution.

Civil Liberty Is Only Natural Liberty, Modified And Secured By The Sanctions Of Civil Society.

To Attach Full Confidence To An Institution Of This Nature, It Appears To Be An Essential Ingredient In Its Structure, That It Shall Be Under Private And Not A Public Direction-under The Guidance Of Individual Interest, Not Of Public Policy; Which, Would Be . . . Liable To Being Too Much Influenced By Public Necessity.

In Politics, As In Religion, It Is Equally Absurd To Aim At Making Proselytes By Fire And Sword. Heresies In Either Can Rarely Be Cured By Persecution.

Separation Of Church And State

. . . [the Judicial Branch] May Truly Be Said To Have Neither Force Nor Will, But Merely Judgment; And Must Ultimately Depend Upon The Aid Of The Executive Arm Even For The Efficacy Of Its Judgments.

Whoever Attentively Considers The Different Departments Of Power Must Perceive, That, In A Government In Which They Are Separated From Each Other, The Judiciary, From The Nature Of Its Functions, Will Always Be The Least Dangerous To The Political Rights Of The Constitution; Because It Will Be Least In A Capacity To Annoy Or Injure Them.

Let Us Recollect That Peace Or War Will Not Always Be Left To Our Option; That However Moderate Or Unambitious We May Be, We Cannot Count Upon The Moderation, Or Hope To Extinguish The Ambition Of Others.

Nothing Is More Natural To Men In Office, Than To Look With Peculiar Deference Towards That Authority To Which They Owe Their Official Existence.

The Institution Of Delegated Power Implies That There Is A Portion Of Virtue And Honor Among Mankind Which May Be A Reasonable Foundation Of Confidence.

Experience Teaches, That Men Are Often So Much Governed By What They Are Accustomed To See And Practice, That The Simplest And Most Obvious Improvements . . . Are Adopted With Hesitation, Reluctance, And Slow Gradations.

If The Federal Government Should Overpass The Just Bounds Of Its Authority And Make A Tyrannical Use Of Its Powers, The People, Whose Creature It Is, Must Appeal To The Standard They Have Formed, And Take Such Measures To Redress The Injury Done To The Constitution As The Exigency May Suggest And Prudence Justify.

Ambition Without Principle Never Was Long Under The Guidance Of Good Sense.

To Cherish And Stimulate The Activity Of The Human Mind, By Multiplying The Objects Of Enterprise, Is Not Among The Least Considerable Of The Expedients, By Which The Wealth Of A Nation May Be Promoted. Even Things In Themselves Not Positively Advantageous, Sometimes Become So, By Their Tendency To Provoke Exertion. Every New Scene, Which Is Opened To The Busy Nature Of Man To Rouse And Exert Itself, Is The Addition Of A New Energy To The General Stock Of Effort.

Nothing Could Be More Ill-judged Than That Intolerant Spirit Which Has, At All Times, Characterized Political Parties.

A Law, By The Very Meaning Of The Term, Includes Supremacy. It Is A Rule Which Those To Whom It Is Prescribed Are Bound To Observe. This Results From Every Political Association.

A Share In The Sovereignty Of The State, Which Is Exercised By The Citizens At Large, In Voting At Elections Is One Of The Most Important Rights Of The Subject, And In A Republic Ought To Stand Foremost In The Estimation Of The Law...that Portion Of The Sovereignty, To Which Each Individual Is Entitled, Can Never Be Too Highly Prized. It Is That For Which We Have Fought And Bled.

[i]n Framing A Government For A Nation We Ought, In Those Provisions Which Are Designed To Be Permanent, To Calculate Not On Temporary, But On Permanent Causes Of Expence.

Passive Commerce . . . Should Thus . . . [compel Us] To Content Ourselves With The First Price Of Our Commodities, And To See The Profits Of Our Trade Snatched From Us, To Enrich Our Enemies And Persecutors. That Unequalled Spirit Of Enterprise . . . An Inexhaustible Mine Of National Wealth, Would Be Stifled And Lost; And Poverty And Disgrace Would Overspread A Country, Which, With Wisdom, Might Make Herself The Admiration And Envy Of The World.

Here, Sir, The People Govern; Here They Act By Their Immediate Representatives.

Representatives

It Is A Well-known Fact That In Countries In Which The National Debt Is Properly Funded, And An Object Of Established Confidence, It Answers Most Of The Purposes Of Money. Transfers Of Stock, Or Public Debt, Are There Equivalent To Payments In Specie; Or, In Other Words, Stock, In The Principal Transactions Of Business, Passes Current As Specie. The Same Thing Would, In All Probability, Happen Here, Under The Like Circumstances.

Give All The Power To The Many, They Will Oppress The Few. Give All The Power To The Few, They Will Oppress The Many.

But As The Plan Of The Convention Aims Only At A Partial Union Or Consolidation, The State Governments Would Clearly Retain All The Rights Of Sovereignty Which They Before Had, And Which Were Not, By That Act, Exclusively Delegated To The United States.

Men Are Rather Reasoning Than Reasonable Animals For The Most Part Governed By The Impulse Of Passion.

No Man In His Senses Can Hesitate In Choosing To Be Free, Rather Than A Slave.

American Revolution

Civil Liberty Is Only Natural Liberty, Modified And Secured By The Sanctions Of Civil Society. It Is Not A Thing, In Its Own Nature, Precarious And Dependent On Human Will And Caprice; But It Is Conformable To The Constitution Of Man, As Well As Necessary To The Well-being Of Society.

With Regard To The Learned Professions, Little Need Be Observed; They Truly Form No Distinct Interest In Society . . . [discussing The Landed, Merchant, And Learned Classes In Legislative Assembly]. Will Not The Man Of The Learned Profession, Who Will Feel A Neutrality To The Rivalships Between The Different Branches Of Industry, Be Likely To Prove An Impartial Arbiter Between Them, Ready To Promote Either, So Far As It Shall Appear To Him Conducive To The General Interests Of Society?

It Is Presumable That No Country Will Be Able To Borrow Of Foreigners Upon Better Terms Than The United States, Because None Can, Perhaps, Afford So Good Security.

The Superiority...enjoyed By Nations That Have...perfected A Branch Of Industry, Constitutes A...formidable Obstacle.

The Loss Of Liberty To A Generous Mind Is Worse Than Death.

I Expect We Shall Be Told, That The Militia Of The Country Is Its Natural Bulwark, And Would Be At All Times Equal To The National Defence...the Facts, Which From Our Own Experience Forbid A Reliance Of This Kind, Are Too Recent To Permit Us To Be The Dupes Of Such A Suggestion.

A Government Ought To Contain In Itself Every Power Requisite To The Full Accomplishment Of The Objects Committed To Its Care, And To The Complete Execution Of The Trusts For Which It Is Responsible, Free From Every Other Control But A Regard To The Public Good And To The Sense Of The People.

There Are Men Who Could Neither Be Distressed Nor Won Into A Sacrifice Of Their Duty; But This Stern Virtue Is The Growth Of Few Soils: And In The Main It Will Be Found, That A Power Over A Man's Support Is A Power Over His Will.

It Will Be Forgotten, On The One Hand, That Jealousy Is The Usual Concomitant Of Violent Love, And That The Noble Enthusiasm Of Liberty Is Too Apt To Be Infected With A Spirit Of Narrow And Illiberal Distrust. On The Other Hand, It Will Be Equally Forgotten, That The Vigour Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty.

I Would Die To Preserve The Law Upon A Solid Foundation; But Take Away Liberty, And The Foundation Is Destroyed.

But The Greatest Obstacle Of All To The Successful Prosecution Of A New Branch Of Industry In A Country, In Which It Was Before Unknown, Consists . . . In The Bounties, Premiums, And Other Aids Which Are Granted, In A Variety Of Cases, By The Nations, In Which The Establishments To Be Imitated Are Previously Introduced.

There Is Something So Far-fetched And So Extravagant In The Idea Of Danger To Liberty From The Militia That One Is At A Loss Whether To Treat It With Gravity Or With Raillery; Whether To Consider It As A Mere Trial Of Skill, Like The Paradoxes Of Rhetoricians; As A Disingenuous Artifice To Instil Prejudices At Any Price; Or As The Serious.

It Is Of The Greatest Consequence That The Debt Should, With The Consent Of The Creditors, Be Remoulded Into Such A Shape As Will Bring The Expenditure Of The Nation To A Level With Its Income. Till This Shall Be Accomplished, The Finances Of The United States Will Never Wear A Proper Countenance. Arrears Of Interest, Continually Accruing, Will Be As Continual A Monument, Either Of Inability, Or Of Ill Faith And Will Not Cease To Have An Evil Influence On Public Credit.

There Is No Position Which Depends On Clearer Principles Than That Every Act Of A Delegated Authority, Contrary To The Commission Under Which It Is Exercised, Is Void. No Legislative Act, Therefore, Contrary To The Constitution, Can Be Valid.

Laws Are A Dead Letter Without Courts To Expound And Define Their True Meaning And Operation.

Hence, In A State Of Nature, No Man Had Any Moral Power To Deprive Another Of His Life, Limbs, Property, Or Liberty; Nor The Least Authority To Command Or Exact Obedience From Him, Except That Which Arose From The Ties Of Consanguinity.

I Will Venture To Assert That No Combination Of Designing Men Under Heaven Will Be Capable Of Making A Government Unpopular Which Is In Its Principles A Wise And Good One, And Vigorous In Its Operations.

People Sometimes Attribute My Success To My Genius; All The Genius I Know Anything About Is Hard Work.

The Constitution Of Human Nature" Teaches Us Not To Expect "that The Persons, Entrusted With The Administration Of The Affairs Of The Particular Members Of A Confederacy, Will At All Times Be Ready, With Perfect Good Humor, And An Unbiased Regard To The Public Weal, To Execute The Resolutions Of Decrees Of The General Authority." "this Tendency Is Not Difficult To Be Accounted For," Publius Argues, "it Has Its Origin In The Love Of Power.

The Passions Of A Revolution Are Apt To Hurry Even Good Men Into Excesses.

The Love For Our Native Land Strengthens Our Individual And National Character.

The Interpretation Of The Laws Is The Proper And Peculiar Province Of The Courts. A Constitution Is, In Fact, And Must Be Regarded By The Judges, As Fundamental Law. It Therefore Belongs To Them To Ascertain Its Meaning, As Well As The Meaning Of Any Particular Act Proceeding From The Legislative Body. If There Should Happen To Be An Irreconcilable Variance Between The Two, That Which Has The Superior Obligation And Validity Ought, Of Course, To Be Preferred; Or, In Other Words, The Constitution Ought To Be Preferred To The Statute, The Intention Of The People To The Intention Of Their Agents.

When Occasions Present Themselves, In Which The Interests Of The People Are At Variance With Their Inclinations, It Is The Duty Of The Persons Whom They Have Appointed To Be The Guardians Of Those Interests, To Withstand The Temporary Delusion, In Order To Give Them Time And Opportunity For More Cool And Sedate Reflection.

A Well Adjusted Person Is One Who Makes The Same Mistake Twice Without Getting Nervous.

If Government Is In The Hands Of The Few, They Will Tyrannize The Many; If In The Hands Of The Many, They Will Tyrannize Over The Few. It Ought To Be In The Hands Of Both, And Be Separated...they Will Need A Mutual Check. This Check Is A Monarch.

There Is At This Present Juncture, A Certain Fermentation Of Mind, A Certain Activity Of Speculation And Enterprise Which If Properly Directed May Be Made Subservient To Useful Purposes; But Which If Left Entirely To Itself, May Be Attended With Pernicious Effects.

This Process Of Election Affords A Moral Certainty That The Office Of President Will Seldom Fall To The Lot Of Any Many Who Is Not In An Eminent Degree Endowed With The Requisite Qualifications.

To Attempt To Enumerate The Complicated Variety Of Mischiefs In The Whole System Of The Social Economy, Which Proceed From A Neglect Of The Maxims That Uphold Public Credit, And Justify The Solicitude Manifested By The House On This Point, Would Be An Improper Intrusion On Their Time And Patience.

...that Standing Army Can Never Be Formidable (threatening) To The Liberties Of The People, While There Is A Large Body Of Citizens, Little If At All Inferior To Them In The Use Of Arms.

In The Main It Will Be Found That A Power Over A Man's Support [salary] Is A Power Over His Will.

Every Power Vested In A Government Is In Its Nature Sovereign, And Includes By Force Of The Term A Right To Employ All The Means Requisite . . . To The Attainment Of The Ends Of Such Power.

I Never Expect To See A Perfect Work From An Imperfect Man.

To Answer The Purpose Of The Adversaries Of The Constitution, They Ought To Prove, Not Merely That Particular Provisions In It Are Not The Best, Which Might Have Been Imagined; But That The Plan Upon The Whole Is Bad And Pernicious.

Good Constitutions Are Formed Upon A Comparison Of The Liberty Of The Individual With The Strength Of Government: If The Tone Of Either Be Too High, The Other Will Be Weakened Too Much. It Is The Happiest Possible Mode Of Conciliating These Objects, To Institute One Branch Peculiarly Endowed With Sensibility, Another With Knowledge And Firmness. Through The Opposition And Mutual Control Of These Bodies, The Government Will Reach, In Its Regular Operations, The Perfect Balance Between Liberty And Power.

Establish That A Government May Decline A Provision For Its Debts, Though Able To Make It, And You Overthrow All Public Morality, You Unhinge All The Principles That Must Preserve The Limits Of Free Constitutions.

The Administration Of Private Justice Between The Citizens Of The Same State, The Supervision Of Agriculture And Of Other Concerns Of A Similar Nature, All Those Things In Short Which Are Proper To Be Provided For By Local Legislation, Can Never Be Desirable Cares Of A General Jurisdiction . . . The Attempt To Exercise These Powers Would Be As Troublesome As It Would Be Nugatory; And The Possession Of Them, For That Reason, Would Contribute Nothing To The Dignity, To The Importance, Or To The Splendour Of The National Government.

A Sacred Respect For The Constitutional Law Is The Vital Principle, The Sustaining Energy Of A Free Government.

[h]owever Weak Our Country May Be, I Hope We Shall Never Sacrifice Our Liberties.

Americans Rouse - Be Unanimous, Be Virtuous, Be Firm, Exert Your Courage, Trust In Heaven, And Nobly Defy The Enemies Both Of God And Man!

The History Of Human Conduct Does Not Warrant That Exalted Opinion Of Human Virtue Which Would Make It Wise In A Nation To Commit Interests Of So Delicate And Momentous A Kind As Those Which Concern Its Intercourse With The Rest Of The World, To The Sole Disposal Of A Magistrate, Created And Circumstanced, As Would Be A President Of The United States.

The Vigour Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty. . . . A Dangerous Ambition More Often Lurks Behind The Specious Mask Of Zeal For The Rights Of The People, Than Under The Forbidding Appearance Of Zeal For The Firmness And Efficiency Of Government.

[t]he Constitution Ought To Be The Standard Of Construction For The Laws, And That Wherever There Is An Evident Opposition, The Laws Ought To Give Place To The Constitution. But This Doctrine Is Not Deducible From Any Circumstance Peculiar To The Plan Of Convention, But From The General Theory Of A Limited Constitution.

Has It Not. . . Invariably Been Found That Momentary Passions, And Immediate Interests, Have A More Active And Imperious Control Over Human Conduct Than General Or Remote Considerations Of Policy, Utility And Justice?

I Confess I Am At A Loss To Discover What Temptation The Persons Entrusted With The Administration Of The General Government Could Ever Feel To Divest The States Of The Authorities Of That Description. The Regulation Of The Mere Domestic Police Of A State Appears To Me To Hold Out Slender Allurements To Ambition.

This Power Ought To Be Coextensive With All The Possible Combinations Of Such Circumstances; And Ought To Be Under The Direction Of The Same Councils Which Are Appointed To Preside Over The Common Defense.

The Achaeans Soon Experienced, As Often Happens, That A Victorious And Powerful Ally Is But Another Name For A Master.

Unless Your Government Is Respectable, Foreigners Will Invade Your Rights; And To Maintain Tranquillity You Must Be Respectable; Even To Observe Neutrality You Must Have A Strong Government.

Why Has Government Been Instituted At All? Because The Passions Of Man Will Not Conform To The Dictates Of Reason And Justice Without Constraint.

Good And Wise Men, In All Ages, Have Embraced A Very Dissimilar Theory. They Have Supposed That The Deity, From The Relations We Stand In To Himself And To Each Other, Has Constituted An Eternal And Immutable Law, Which Is Indispensably Obligatory Upon All Mankind, Prior To Any Human Institution Whatever. This Is What Is Called The Law Of Nature....upon This Law Depend The Natural Rights Of Mankind.

To Cherish And Stimulate The Activity Of The Human Mind, By Multiplying The Objects Of Enterprise, Is Not Among The Least Considerable Of The Expedients, By Which The Wealth Of A Nation May Be Promoted.

These Are Not Vague Inferences . . . But They Are Solid Conclusions Drawn From The Natural And Necessary Progress Of Human Affairs.

It Is By Far The Safer Course To Lay [considerations Of The Future] Altogether Aside; And To Confine Our Attention Wholly To The Nature And Extent Of The Powers As They Are Delineated In The Constitution. Everything Beyond This, Must Be Left To The Prudence And Firmness Of The People; Who, As They Will Hold The Scales In Their Own Hands, It Is To Be Hoped, Will Always Take Care To Preserve The Constitutional Equilibrium Between The General And State Governments.

The Natural Effect Of Low Interest Is To Increase Trade And Industry; Because Undertakings Of Every Kind Can Be Prosecuted With Greater Advantage.

If We Incline Too Much To Democracy, We Shall Soon Shoot Into A Monarchy.

Is It Not Time To Awake From The Deceitful Dream Of A Golden Age, And To Adopt As A Practical Maxim For The Direction Of Our Political Conduct, That We, As Well As The Other Inhabitants Of The Globe, Are Yet Remote From The Happy Empire Of Perfect Wisdom And Perfect Virtue?

No Person That Has Enjoyed The Sweets Of Liberty Can Be Insensible Of Its Infinite Value, Or Can Reflect On Its Reverse Without Horror And Detestation

The Proposed Constitution, So Far From Implying An Abolition Of The State Governments, Makes Them Constituent Parts Of The National Sovereignty, By Allowing Them A Direct Representation In The Senate, And Leaves In Their Possession Certain Exclusive And Very Important Portions Of Sovereign Power. This Fully Corresponds, In Every Rational Import Of The Terms, With The Idea Of A Federal Government.

If Mankind Were To Resolve To Agree In No Institution Of Government, Until Every Part Of It Had Been Adjusted To The Most Exact Standard Of Perfection, Society Would Soon Become A General Scene Of Anarchy, And The World A Desert.

The People Are Turbulent And Changing; They Seldom Judge Right Or Make Good Decision.

The Complete Independence Of The Courts Of Justice Is Peculiarly Essential In A Limited Constitution. By A Limited Constitution, I Understand One Which Contains Certain Specified Exceptions To The Legislative Authority. Limitations Of This Kind Can Be Preserved In Practice No Other Way Than Through The Medium Of Courts Of Justice, Whose Duty It Must Be To Declare All Acts Contrary To The Manifest Tenor Of The Constitution Void. Without This, All The Reservations Of Particular Rights Or Privileges Would Amount To Nothing.

There Is A Certain Enthusiasm In Liberty, That Makes Human Nature Rise Above Itself, In Acts Of Bravery And Heroism.

The Truth Is That The General Genius Of A Government Is All That Can Be Substantially Relied Upon For Permanent Effects. Particular Provisions, Though Not Altogether Useless, Have Far Less Virtue And Efficacy Than Are Commonly Ascribed To Them; And The Want Of Them Will Never Be With Men Of Sound Discernment A Decisive Objection To Any Plan Which Exhibits The Leading Characters Of A Good Government.

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