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The History Of Human Conduct Does Not Warrant That Exalted Opinion Of Human Virtue Which Would Make It Wise In A Nation To Commit Interests Of So Delicate And Momentous A Kind As Those Which Concern Its Intercourse With The Rest Of The World, To The Sole Disposal Of A Magistrate, Created And Circumstanced, As Would Be A President Of The United States.

-Alexander Hamilton

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The History Of Human

Alexander Hamilton

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The History Of Human Conduct Does Not Warrant That Exalted Opinion Of Human Virtue Which Would Make It Wise In A Nation To Commit Interests Of So Delicate And Momentous A Kind As Those Which Concern Its Intercourse With The Rest Of The World, To The Sole Disposal Of A Magistrate, Created And Circumstanced, As Would Be A President Of The United States.

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Give All The Power To The Many, They Will Oppress The Few. Give All The Power To The Few, They Will Oppress The Many.

Constitutions Of Civil Government Are Not To Be Framed Upon A Calculation Of Existing Exigencies, But Upon A Combination Of These With The Probable Exigencies Of Ages, According To The Natural And Tried Course Of Human Affairs. Nothing, Therefore, Can Be More Fallacious Than To Infer The Extent Of Any Power, Proper To Be Lodged In The National Government, From An Estimate Of Its Immediate Necessities.

A Habit Of Labor In The People Is As Essential To The Health And Rigor Of Their Minds And Bodies As It Is Conducive To The Welfare Of The State.

The Natural Effect Of Low Interest Is To Increase Trade And Industry; Because Undertakings Of Every Kind Can Be Prosecuted With Greater Advantage.

Americans Rouse - Be Unanimous, Be Virtuous, Be Firm, Exert Your Courage, Trust In Heaven, And Nobly Defy The Enemies Both Of God And Man!

In A Free Government, The Security For Civil Rights Must Be The Same As That For Religious Rights. It Consists In The One Case In The Multiplicity Of Interests, And In The Other In The Multiplicity Of Sects.

The Civil Jury Is A Valuable Safeguard To Liberty.

A National Debt If It Is Not Excessive Will Be To Us A National Blessing; It Will Be Powerfull Cement Of Our Union. It Will Also Create A Necessity For Keeping Up Taxation To A Degree Which Without Being Oppressive, Will Be A Spur To Industry.

The Inhabitants Of Territories, Often The Theatre Of War, Are Unavoidably Subject To Frequent Infringements On Their Rights, Which Serve To Weaken Their Sense Of Those Rights; And By Degrees, The People Are Brought To Consider The Soldiery Not Only As Their Protectors But As Their Superiors.

These Are Not Vague Inferences . . . But They Are Solid Conclusions Drawn From The Natural And Necessary Progress Of Human Affairs.

Passive Commerce . . . Should Thus . . . [compel Us] To Content Ourselves With The First Price Of Our Commodities, And To See The Profits Of Our Trade Snatched From Us, To Enrich Our Enemies And Persecutors. That Unequalled Spirit Of Enterprise . . . An Inexhaustible Mine Of National Wealth, Would Be Stifled And Lost; And Poverty And Disgrace Would Overspread A Country, Which, With Wisdom, Might Make Herself The Admiration And Envy Of The World.

It Is One Thing To Be Subordinate To The Laws, And Another [for The Executive] To Be Dependent On The Legislative Body. The First Comports With, The Last Violates, The Fundamental Principles Of Good Government; And, Whatever May Be The Forms Of The Constitution, Unites All Power In The Same Hands.

The Achaeans Soon Experienced, As Often Happens, That A Victorious And Powerful Ally Is But Another Name For A Master.

The People Alone Have An Incontestable, Unalienable, And Indefeasible Right To Institute Government And To Reform, Alter, Or Totally Change The Same When Their Protection, Safety, Prosperity, And Happiness Require It.

By A Steady Adherence To The Union We May Hope, Erelong, To Become The Arbiter Of Europe In America, And To Be Able To Incline The Balance Of European Competitions In This Part Of The World As Our Interest May Dictate.

When Human Laws Contradict Or Discountenance The Means, Which Are Necessary To Preserve The Essential Rights Of Any Society, They Defeat The Proper End Of All Laws, And So Become Null And Void.

If The End Be Clearly Comprehended Within Any Of The Specified Powers, And If The Measure Have An Obvious Relation To That End, And Is Not Forbidden By Any Particular Provision Of The Constitution, It May Safely Be Deemed To Come Within The Compass Of The National Authority.

Even To Observe Neutrality You Must Have A Strong Government.

Let Americans Disdain To Be The Instruments Of European Greatness! Let The Thirteen States, Bound Together In A Strict And Indissoluble Union, Concur In Erecting One Great American System, Superior To The Control Of All Transatlantic Force Or Influence, And Able To Dictate The Terms Of The Connection Between The Old And The New World!

It May Be Laid Down As A General Rule, That Their Confidence In And Obedience To A Government, Will Be Commonly Proportioned To The Goodness Or Badness Of Its Administration . . . . Various Reasons Have Been Suggested In The Course Of These Papers, To Induce A Probability That The General Government Will Be Better Administered Than The Particular Governments.

The Changes In The Human Condition Are Uncertain And Frequent. Many, On Whom Fortune Has Bestowed Her Favours, May Trace Their Family To A More Unprosperous Station; And Many Who Are Now In Obscurity, May Look Back Upon The Affluence And Exalted Rank Of Their Ancestors.

The Reasonableness Of The Agency Of The National Courts In Cases In Which The State Tribunals Cannot Be Supposed To Be Impartial, Speaks For Itself. No Man Ought Certainly To Be A Judge In His Own Cause, Or In Any Cause In Respect To Which He Has The Least Interest Or Bias.

Little More Can Reasonably Be Aimed At With Respect To The People At Large Than To Have Them Properly Armed.

Second Amendment

Nothing Can Be More Evident, Than That An Exclusive Power Of Regulating Elections For The National Government, In The Hands Of The State Legislatures, Would Leave The Existence Of The Union Entirely At Their Mercy . . . . It Is To Little Purpose To Say That A Neglect Or Omission Of This Kind [not Letting The Feds Have Elections], Would Be Unlikely To Take Place. The Constitutional Possibility Of The Thing, Without An Equivalent For The Risk, Is An Unanswerable Objection.

The Principal Purposes To Be Answered By Union Are These The Common Defense Of The Members; The Preservation Of The Public Peace As Well Against Internal Convulsions As External Attacks; The Regulation Of Commerce With Other Nations And Between The States; The Superintendence Of Our Intercourse, Political And Commercial, With Foreign Countries.

These Powers Ought To Exist Without Limitation, Because It Is Impossible To Foresee Or To Define The Extent And Variety Of National Exigencies, And The Correspondent Extent And Variety Of The Means Which May Be Necessary To Satisfy Them.

The Idea Of Restraining The Legislative Authority, In The Means Of Providing For The National Defense, Is One Of Those Refinements Which Owe Their Origin To A Zeal For Liberty More Ardent Than Enlightened.

It Is A Singular Capriciousness Of The Human Mind, That After All The Admonitions We Have Had From Experience On This Head, There Should Still Be Found Men, Who Object To The New Constitution For Deviating From A Principle Which Has Been Found The Bane Of The Old.

Law Is Defined To Be A Rule Of Action; But How Can That Be A Rule, Which Is Little Known And Less Fixed?

There Are Some Who Maintain That Trade Will Regulate Itself, And It Is Not To Be Benefited By The Encouragements Or Restraints Of Government. Such Persons Will Imagine That There Is No Need Of A Common Directing Power. This Is One Of Those Wild Speculative Paradoxes, Which Have Grown Into Credit Among Us, Contrary To The Uniform Practice And Sense Of The Most Enlightened Nations.

Schemes To Subvert The Liberties Of A Great Community Require Time To Mature Them For Execution.

The True Principle Of Government Is This - Make The System Compleat In Its Structure; Give A Perfect Proportion And Balance To Its Parts; And The Powers You Give It Will Never Affect Your Security.

Responsibility, In Order To Be Reasonable, Must Be Limited To Objects Within The Power Of The Responsible Party, And In Order To Be Effectual, Must Relate To Operations Of That Power, Of Which A Ready And Proper Judgment Can Be Formed By The Constituents.

As To Taxes, They Are Evidently Inseparable From Government. It Is Impossible Without Them To Pay The Debts Of The Nation, To Protect It From Foreign Danger, Or To Secure Individuals From Lawless Violence And Rapine.

I Go Further, And Affirm That Bills Of Rights, In The Sense And To The Extent In Which They Are Contended For, Are Not Only Unnecessary In The Proposed Constitution, But Would Even Be Dangerous. They Would Contain Various Exceptions To Powers Not Granted; And On This Very Account, Would Afford A Colorable Pretext To Claim More Than Were Granted. For Why Declare That Things Shall Not Be Done Which There Is No Power To Do?

The Powers Contained In A Constitution...ought To Be Construed Liberally In Advancement Of The Public Good.

Our Countrymen Have All The Folly Of The Ass And All The Passiveness Of The Sheep.

The Great Leading Objects Of The Federal Government, In Which Revenue Is Concerned, Are To Maintain Domestic Peace, And Provide For The Common Defense.

Take Mankind As They Are, And What Are They Governed By? Their Passions.

[in The Event Of War, Americans Would] Resort For Repose And Security To Institutions Which Have A Tendency To Destroy Their Civil And Political Rights. To Be More Safe They, At Length, Become Willing To Run The Risk Of Being Less Free.

As To Religion A Moderate Stock Will Satisfy Me. She Must Believe In God And Hate A Saint.

Wherever Indeed A Right Of Property Is Infringed For The General Good, If The Nature Of The Case Admits Of Compensation, It Ought To Be Made; But If Compensation Be Impracticable, That Impracticability Ought To Be An Obstacle To A Clearly Essential Reform.

The Natural Cure For An Ill-administration, In A Popular Or Representative Constitution, Is A Change Of Men.

When The Sword Is Once Drawn, The Passions Of Men Observe No Bounds Of Moderation.

[t]he Constitution Ought To Be The Standard Of Construction For The Laws, And That Wherever There Is An Evident Opposition, The Laws Ought To Give Place To The Constitution. But This Doctrine Is Not Deducible From Any Circumstance Peculiar To The Plan Of Convention, But From The General Theory Of A Limited Constitution.

To Judge From The History Of Mankind, We Shall Be Compelled To Conclude, That The Fiery And Destructive Passions Of War, Reign In The Human Breast, With Much More Powerful Sway, Than The Mild And Beneficent Sentiments Of Peace.

That Instability Is Inherent In The Nature Of Popular Governments, I Think Very Disputable … A Representative Democracy, Where The Right Of Election Is Well Secured And Regulated & The Exercise Of The Legislature, Executive, And Judiciary Authorities, Is Vested In Select Persons, Chosen Really And Not Nominally By The People, Will In My Opinion Be Most Likely To Be Happy, Regular And Durable.

[e]very Act Of A Delegated Authority, Contrary To The Tenor Of The Commission Under Which It Is Exercised, Is Void. No Legislative Act, Therefore, Contrary To The Constitution, Can Be Valid. To Deny This, Would Be To Affirm, That The Deputy Is Greater Than His Principal; That The Servant Is Above His Master; That The Representatives Of The People Are Superior To The People Themselves; That Men Acting By Virtue Of Powers, May Do Not Only What Their Powers Do Not Authorize, But What They Forbid.

[s]ound Policy Condemns The Practice Of Accumulating Debts.

It Is Astonishing That So Simple A Truth Should Ever Have Had An Adversary; And It Is One Among A Multitude Of Proofs, How Apt A Spirit Of Ill-informed Jealousy, Or Of Too Great Abstraction And Refinement Is To Lead Men Astray From The Plainest Paths Of Reason And Conviction.

By Multiplying The Means Of Gratification, By Promoting The Introduction And Circulation Of The Precious Metals, Those Darling Objects Of Human Avarice And Enterprise, It Serves To Vivify And Invigorate The Channels Of Industry, And To Make Them Flow With Greater Activity And Copiousness. The Assiduous Merchant, The Laborious Husbandman, The Active Mechanic, And The Industrious Manufacturer,-all Orders Of Men, Look Forward With Eager Expectation And Growing Alacrity To This Pleasing Reward Of Their Toils.

. . . [the Judicial Branch] May Truly Be Said To Have Neither Force Nor Will, But Merely Judgment; And Must Ultimately Depend Upon The Aid Of The Executive Arm Even For The Efficacy Of Its Judgments.

The Awful Discretion, Which A Court Of Impeachments Must Necessarily Have, To Doom To Honor Or To Infamy The Most Confidential And The Most Distinguished Characters Of The Community, Forbids The Commitment Of The Trust To A Small Number Of Persons.

A Government Ought To Contain In Itself Every Power Requisite To The Full Accomplishment Of The Objects Committed To Its Care, And To The Complete Execution Of The Trusts For Which It Is Responsible, Free From Every Other Control But A Regard To The Public Good And To The Sense Of The People.

A Nation Has A Right To Manage Its Own Concerns As It Thinks Fit.

We Must Make The Best Of Those Ills Which Cannot Be Avoided.

Laws Are A Dead Letter Without Courts To Expound And Define Their True Meaning And Operation.

The Standard Of Good Behavior For The Continuance In Office Of The Judicial Magistracy Is Certainly One Of The Most Valuable Of The Modern Improvements In The Practice Of Government.

If The Exercise Of Power Of Internal Taxation By The Union Should Be Discovered On Experiment To Be Really Inconvenient, The Federal Government May Then Forbear The Use Of It . . .

In All Very Numerous Assemblies, Of Whatever Character Composed, Passion Never Fails To Wrest The Sceptre From Reason. Had Every Athenian Citizen Been A Socrates, Every Athenian Assembly Would Still Have Been A Mob.

If There Are Such Things As Political Axioms, The Propriety Of The Judicial Power Of A Government Being Co-extensive With Its Legislative, May Be Ranked Among The Number.

Whoever Attentively Considers The Different Departments Of Power Must Perceive, That, In A Government In Which They Are Separated From Each Other, The Judiciary, From The Nature Of Its Functions, Will Always Be The Least Dangerous To The Political Rights Of The Constitution; Because It Will Be Least In A Capacity To Annoy Or Injure Them.

The Republican Principle Demands That The Deliberate Sense Of The Community Should Govern The Conduct Of Those To Whom They Intrust The Management Of Their Affairs; But It Does Not Require An Unqualified Complaisance To Every Sudden Breeze Of Passion Or To Every Transient Impulse Which The People May Receive From The Arts Of Men, Who Flatter Their Prejudices To Betray Their Interests.

The Scheme Of Separate Confederacies, Which Will Always Multiply The Chances Of Ambition, Will Be A Never Failing Bait To All Such Influential Characters In The State Administrations As Are Capable Of Preferring Their Own Emolument And Advancement To The Public Weal.

The Militia Is A Voluntary Force Not Associated Or Under The Control Of The States Except When Called Out; [ When Called Into Actual Service] A Permanent Or Long Standing Force Would Be Entirely Different In Make-up And Call.

While The Constitution Continues To Be Read, And Its Principles Known, The States, Must, By Every Rational Man, Be Considered As Essential Component Parts Of The Union; And Therefore The Idea Of Sacrificing The Former To The Latter Is Totally Inadmissible.

The Voice Of The People Has Been Said To Be The Voice Of God; And, However Generally This Maxim Has Been Quoted And Believed, It Is Not True To Fact. The People Are Turbulent And Changing, They Seldom Judge Or Determine Right.

A Nation Which Can Prefer Disgrace To Danger Is Prepared For A Master, And Deserves One.

American Revolution

The Same Rule That Teaches The Propriety Of A Partition Between The Various Branches Of Power, Teaches Us Likewise That This Partition Ought To Be So Contrived As To Render The One Independent Of The Other.

Divide Et Impera Must Be The Motto Of Every Nation That Either Hates Or Fears Us.

The [president] Has No Particle Of Spiritual Jurisdiction. . . .

We Are Attempting, By This Constitution, To Abolish Factions, And To Unite All Parties For The General Welfare.

The Propriety Of A Law, In A Constitutional Light, Must Always Be Determined By The Nature Of The Powers Upon Which It Is Founded.

To Cherish And Stimulate The Activity Of The Human Mind, By Multiplying The Objects Of Enterprise, Is Not Among The Least Considerable Of The Expedients, By Which The Wealth Of A Nation May Be Promoted. Even Things In Themselves Not Positively Advantageous, Sometimes Become So, By Their Tendency To Provoke Exertion. Every New Scene, Which Is Opened To The Busy Nature Of Man To Rouse And Exert Itself, Is The Addition Of A New Energy To The General Stock Of Effort.

How Can You Trust People Who Are Poor And Own No Property? ... Inequality Of Property Will Exist As Long As Liberty Exists.

A Sacred Respect For The Constitutional Law Is The Vital Principle, The Sustaining Energy Of A Free Government.

It May Be Said That The Power Of Preventing Bad Laws Includes That Of Preventing Good Ones; And May Be Used To The One Purpose As Well As To The Other. But This Objection Will Have Little Weight With Those Who Can Properly Estimate The Mischiefs Of That Inconstancy And Mutability In The Laws, Which Form The Greatest Blemish In The Character And Genius Of Our Governments.

A National Debt, If It Is Not Excessive, Will Be To Us A National Blessing.

The Obscurity Is Much Oftener In The Passions And Prejudices Of The Reasoner Than In The Subject.

It Will Be Forgotten, On The One Hand, That Jealousy Is The Usual Concomitant Of Violent Love, And That The Noble Enthusiasm Of Liberty Is Too Apt To Be Infected With A Spirit Of Narrow And Illiberal Distrust. On The Other Hand, It Will Be Equally Forgotten, That The Vigour Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty.

There Is Nothing Absurd Or Impracticable In The Idea Of A League Or Alliance Between Independent Nations For Certain Defined Purposes Precisely Stated In A Treaty Regulating All The Details Of Time, Place, Circumstance, And Quantity; Leaving Nothing To Future Discretion; And Depending For Its Execution On The Good Faith Of The Parties.

When Men, Engaged In Unjustifiable Pursuits, Are Aware That Obstructions May Come From A Quarter Which Bare Apprehension Of Opposition From Doing What They Would With Eagerness Rush Into If No Such External Impediments Were To Be Feared.

The Tendency Of A National Bank Is To Increase Public And Private Credit. The Former Gives Power To The State, For The Protection Of Its Rights And Interests: And The Latter Facilitates And Extends The Operations Of Commerce Among Individuals. Industry Is Increased, Commodities Are Multiplied, Agriculture And Manufacturers Flourish: And Herein Consists The True Wealth And Prosperity Of A State.

A Republic Of This Kind, Able To Withstand An External Force, May Support Itself Without Any Internal Corruptions. The Form Of This Society Prevents All Manner Of Inconveniences.

If Duties Are Too High, They Lessen The Consumption; The Collection Is Eluded; And The Product To The Treasury Is Not So Great As When They Are Confined Within Proper And Moderate Bounds. This Forms A Complete Barrier Against Any Material Oppression Of The Citizens By Taxes Of This Class, And Is Itself A Natural Limitation Of The Power Of Imposing Them.

The Loss Of Liberty To A Generous Mind Is Worse Than Death.

To Watch The Progress Of Such Endeavors Is The Office Of A Free Press. To Give Us Early Alarm And Put Us On Our Guard Against Encroachments Of Power. This Then Is A Right Of Utmost Importance, One For Which, Instead Of Yielding It Up, We Ought Rather To Spill Our Blood.

For, When The Credit Of A Country Is In Any Degree Questionable, It Never Fails To Give On Extravagant Premium, In One Shape Or Another, Upon All The Loans It Has Occasion To Make. Nor Does The Evil End Here; The Same Disadvantage Must Be Sustained Upon Whatever Is To Be Bought On Terms Of Future Payment. From This Constant Necessity Of Borrowing And Buying Dear, It Is Easy To Conceive How Immensely The Expenses Of A Nation, In A Course Of Time, Will Be Augmented By An Unsound State Of The Public Credit.

Self-preservation Is The First Principle Of Our Nature.

It Is An Unquestionable Truth, That The Body Of The People In Every Country Desire Sincerely Its Prosperity. But It Is Equally Unquestionable That They Do Not Possess The Discernment And Stability Necessary For Systematic Government. To Deny That They Are Frequently Led Into The Grossest Of Errors, By Misinformation And Passion, Would Be A Flattery Which Their Own Good Sense Must Despise.

It Is Evident From The State Of The Country, From The Habits Of The People, From The Experience We Have Had On The Point Itself, That It Is Impracticable To Raise Any Very Considerable Sums By Direct Taxation.

Every Power Vested In A Government Is In Its Nature Sovereign, And Includes By Force Of The Term A Right To Employ All The Means Requisite . . . To The Attainment Of The Ends Of Such Power.

This Power Ought To Be Coextensive With All The Possible Combinations Of Such Circumstances; And Ought To Be Under The Direction Of The Same Councils Which Are Appointed To Preside Over The Common Defense.

Is It Not Time To Awake From The Deceitful Dream Of A Golden Age, And To Adopt As A Practical Maxim For The Direction Of Our Political Conduct, That We, As Well As The Other Inhabitants Of The Globe, Are Yet Remote From The Happy Empire Of Perfect Wisdom And Perfect Virtue?

It Is A General Principle Of Human Nature, That A Man Will Be Interested In Whatever He Possesses, In Proportion To The Firmness Or Precariousness Of The Tenure By Which He Holds It; Will Be Less Attached To What He Holds By A Momentary Or Uncertain Title, Than To What He Enjoys By A Durable Or Certain Title; And, Of Course, Will Be Willing To Risk More For The Sake Of The One, Than For The Sake Of The Other.

Common Interest May Always Be Reckoned Upon As The Surest Bond Of Sympathy.

Learn To Think Continentally.

Good Constitutions Are Formed Upon A Comparison Of The Liberty Of The Individual With The Strength Of Government: If The Tone Of Either Be Too High, The Other Will Be Weakened Too Much. It Is The Happiest Possible Mode Of Conciliating These Objects, To Institute One Branch Peculiarly Endowed With Sensibility, Another With Knowledge And Firmness. Through The Opposition And Mutual Control Of These Bodies, The Government Will Reach, In Its Regular Operations, The Perfect Balance Between Liberty And Power.

To Attempt To Enumerate The Complicated Variety Of Mischiefs In The Whole System Of The Social Economy, Which Proceed From A Neglect Of The Maxims That Uphold Public Credit, And Justify The Solicitude Manifested By The House On This Point, Would Be An Improper Intrusion On Their Time And Patience.

Tyranny Has Perhaps Oftener Grown Out Of The Assumptions Of Power, Called For, On Pressing Exigencies, By A Defective Constitution, Than Out Of The Full Exercise Of The Largest Constitutional Authorities.

Those Who Do Not Industrialize Become Hewers Of Wood And Hawkers Of Water

And It Is Long Since I Have Learned To Hold Popular Opinion Of No Value.

Let Experience, The Least Fallible Guide Of Human Opinion, Be Appealed To For An Answer To These Inquiries.

No Man In His Senses Can Hesitate In Choosing To Be Free, Rather Than A Slave.

American Revolution

Man Is A Reasoning Rather Than A Reasonable Animal.

To Attach Full Confidence To An Institution Of This Nature, It Appears To Be An Essential Ingredient In Its Structure, That It Shall Be Under Private And Not A Public Direction-under The Guidance Of Individual Interest, Not Of Public Policy; Which, Would Be . . . Liable To Being Too Much Influenced By Public Necessity.

There Are Respectable Individuals, Who From A Just Aversion To An Accumulation Of Public Debt, Are Unwilling To Concede To It Any Kind Of Utility, Who Can Discern No Good To Alleviate The Ill With Which They Suppose It Pregnant; Who Cannot Be Persuaded That It Ought In Any Sense To Be Viewed As An Increase Of Capital Lest It Should Be Inferred, That The More Debt The More Capital, The Greater The Burthens The Greater The Blessings Of The Community.

It Is A Just Observation That The People Commonly Intend The Public Good. This Often Applies To Their Very Errors. But Their Good Sense Would Despise The Adulator Who Should Pretend They Always Reason Right About The Means Of Promoting It.

I Confess I Am At A Loss To Discover What Temptation The Persons Entrusted With The Administration Of The General Government Could Ever Feel To Divest The States Of The Authorities Of That Description. The Regulation Of The Mere Domestic Police Of A State Appears To Me To Hold Out Slender Allurements To Ambition.

To Look For A Continuation In Harmony Between A Number Of Independent Unconnected Sovereignties, Situated In The Same Neighborhood, Would Be To Disregard The Uniform Course Of Human Events, And To Set At Defiance The Accumulated Experience Of Ages.

[v]igor Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty.

Necessity, Especially In Politics, Often Occasions False Hopes, False Reasonings, And A System Of Measures, Correspondingly Erroneous.

But Might Not His [the President's] Nomination Be Overruled? I Grant It Might, Yet This Could Only Be To Make Place For Another Nomination By Himself. The Person Ultimately Appointed Must Be Object Of His Preference, Though Perhaps Not In The First Degree. It Is Also Not Very Probable That His Nomination Would Often Be Overruled.

They Are Not Rules Prescribed By The Sovereign To The Subject, But Agreements Between Sovereign And Sovereign.

There Is At This Present Juncture, A Certain Fermentation Of Mind, A Certain Activity Of Speculation And Enterprise Which If Properly Directed May Be Made Subservient To Useful Purposes; But Which If Left Entirely To Itself, May Be Attended With Pernicious Effects.

The Desire Of Reward Is One Of The Strongest Incentives Of Human Conduct; ... The Best Security For The Fidelity Of Mankind Is To Make Their Interest Coincide With Their Duty.

The Proposed Constitution, So Far From Implying An Abolition Of The State Governments, Makes Them Constituent Parts Of The National Sovereignty, By Allowing Them A Direct Representation In The Senate, And Leaves In Their Possession Certain Exclusive And Very Important Portions Of Sovereign Power. This Fully Corresponds, In Every Rational Import Of The Terms, With The Idea Of A Federal Government.

There Can Be No Limitation Of That Authority Which Is To Provide For The Defense And Protection Of The Community In Any Matter Essential To The Formation, Direction, Or Support Of The National Forces.

To Answer The Purpose Of The Adversaries Of The Constitution, They Ought To Prove, Not Merely That Particular Provisions In It Are Not The Best, Which Might Have Been Imagined; But That The Plan Upon The Whole Is Bad And Pernicious.

This Process Of Election Affords A Moral Certainty That The Office Of President Will Seldom Fall To The Lot Of Any Many Who Is Not In An Eminent Degree Endowed With The Requisite Qualifications.

It's Not Tyranny We Desire; It's A Just, Limited, Federal Government.

The President Is To Be Commander-in-chief Of The Army And Navy Of The United States. In This Respect His Authority Would Be Nominally The Same With That Of The King Of Great Britain, But In Substance Much Inferior To It. It Would Amount To Nothing More Than The Supreme Command And Direction Of The Land And Naval Forces, As First General And Admiral ... While That Of The British King Extends To The Declaring Of War And To The Raising And Regulating Of Fleets And Armies - All Which, By The Constitution Under Consideration, Would Appertain To The Legislature.

The Experience Of Past Ages May Inform Us, That When The Circumstances Of A People Render Them Distressed, Their Rulers Generally Recur To Severe, Cruel, And Oppressive Measures. Instead Of Endeavoring To Establish Their Authority In The Affection Of Their Subjects, They Think They Have No Security But In Their Fear.

To Cherish And Stimulate The Activity Of The Human Mind, By Multiplying The Objects Of Enterprise, Is Not Among The Least Considerable Of The Expedients, By Which The Wealth Of A Nation May Be Promoted.

[imeachable Conduct Is] Misconduct By Public Men, Or, In Other Words, From The Abuse Or Violation Of Some Public Trust.

Allow A Government To Decline Paying Its Debts And You Overthrow All Public Morality-you Unhinge All The Principles That Preserve The Limits Of Free Constitutions. Nothing Can More Affect National Prosperity Than A Constant And Systematic Attention To Extinguish The Present Debt And To Avoid As Much As Possibly The Incurring Of Any New Debt.

With Regard To The Learned Professions, Little Need Be Observed; They Truly Form No Distinct Interest In Society . . . [discussing The Landed, Merchant, And Learned Classes In Legislative Assembly]. Will Not The Man Of The Learned Profession, Who Will Feel A Neutrality To The Rivalships Between The Different Branches Of Industry, Be Likely To Prove An Impartial Arbiter Between Them, Ready To Promote Either, So Far As It Shall Appear To Him Conducive To The General Interests Of Society?

In This Distribution Of Powers The Wisdom Of Our Constitution Is Manifested. It Is The Province And Duty Of The Executive To Preserve To The Nation The Blessings Of Peace. The Legislature Alone Can Interrupt Those Blessings, By Placing The Nation In A State Of War.

Distribution Of Power

[i]n Framing A Government For A Nation We Ought, In Those Provisions Which Are Designed To Be Permanent, To Calculate Not On Temporary, But On Permanent Causes Of Expence.

The State Governments Possess Inherent Advantages, Which Will Ever Give Them An Influence And Ascendancy Over The National Government, And Will For Ever Preclude The Possibility Of Federal Encroachments. That Their Liberties, Indeed, Can Be Subverted By The Federal Head, Is Repugnant To Every Rule Of Political Calculation.

Give Me The Steady, Uniform, Unshaken Security Of Constitutional Freedom. Give Me The Right To Be Tried By A Jury Of My Own Neighbors, And To Be Taxed By My Own Representatives Only. What Will Become Of The Law And Courts Of Justice Without This? The Shadow May Remain, But The Substance Will Be Gone. I Would Die To Preserve The Law Upon A Solid Foundation; But Take Away Liberty, And The Foundation Is Destroyed.

A Struggle For Liberty Is In Itself Respectable And Glorious. . . . When Conducted With Magnanimity, Justice And Humanity, It Ought To Command The Admiration Of Every Friend To Human Nature. But If Sullied By Crimes And Extravagancies, It Loses Its Respectability.

Would There Not Be The Greatest Reason To Apprehend, That Error In The First Sentence Would Be The Parent Of Error In The Second Sentence? That The Strong Bias Of One Decision Would Be Apt To Overrule The Influence Of Any New Lights, Which Might Be Brought To Vary The Complexion Of Another Decision? Those, Who Know Any Thing Of Human Nature, Will Not Hesitate To Answer These Questions In The Affirmative.

[t]here Is Not A Syllable In The Plan Under Consideration Which Directly Empowers The National Courts To Construe The Laws According To The Spirit Of The Constitution.

The Truth Is That The General Genius Of A Government Is All That Can Be Substantially Relied Upon For Permanent Effects. Particular Provisions, Though Not Altogether Useless, Have Far Less Virtue And Efficacy Than Are Commonly Ascribed To Them; And The Want Of Them Will Never Be With Men Of Sound Discernment A Decisive Objection To Any Plan Which Exhibits The Leading Characters Of A Good Government.

Men Are Rather Reasoning Than Reasonable Animals For The Most Part Governed By The Impulse Of Passion. This Is A Truth Well Understood By Our Adversaries Who Have Practised Upon It With No Small Benefit To Their Cause. For At The Very Moment They Are Eulogizing The Reason Of Men & Professing To Appeal Only To That Faculty, They Are Courting The Strongest & Most Active Passion Of The Human Heart - Vanity!

The History Of Ancient And Modern Republics Had Taught Them That Many Of The Evils Which Those Republics Suffered Arose From The Want Of A Certain Balance, And That Mutual Control Indispensable To A Wise Administration. They Were Convinced That Popular Assemblies Are Frequently Misguided By Ignorance, By Sudden Impulses, And The Intrigues Of Ambitious Men; And That Some Firm Barrier Against These Operations Was Necessary. They, Therefore, Instituted Your Senate.

It Is Just Observation That The People Commonly Intend The Public Good.

That There May Happen Cases In Which The National Government May Be Necessitated To Resort To Force, Cannot Be Denied.

In Disquisitions Of Every Kind There Are Certain Primary Truths, Or First Principles, Upon Which All Subsequent Reasoning Must Depend.

Manufacturing Establishments Not Only Occasion A Positive Augmentation Of The Produce And Revenue Of The Society . . . They Contribute Essentially To Rendering Them Greater Than They Could Possibly Be, Without Such Establishments. These Circumstances Are . . . Greater Scope For The Diversity Of Talents And Dispositions Which Discriminate Men From Each Other.

A Government, The Constitution Of Which Renders It Unfit To Be Trusted With All The Powers Which A Free People Ought To Delegate To Any Government, Would Be An Unsafe And Improper Depositary Of The National Interests.

The Passions Of A Revolution Are Apt To Hurry Even Good Men Into Excesses.

The Best We Can Hope For Concerning The People At Large Is That They Be Properly Armed.

That This Gentleman [president John Adams] Ought Not To Be The Object Of The Federal Wish, Is, With Me, Reduced To Demonstration. His Administration Has Already Very Materially Disgraced And Sunk The Government. There Are Defects In His Character Which Must Inevitably Continue To Do This More And More. And If He Is Supported By The Federal Party, His Party Must In The Issue Fall With Him.

The Convention Probably Foresaw What It Has Been A Principal Aim Of These Papers To Inculcate That The Danger Which Most Threatens Our Political Welfare Is, That The State Governments Will Finally Sap The Foundations Of The Union.

The System Is The Best That The Present Views And Circumstances Of The Country Will Permit.

Constitutions Should Consist Only Of General Provisions; The Reason Is That They Must Necessarily Be Permanent, And That They Cannot Calculate For The Possible Change Of Things.

Constitution Of The United States

Great Ambition, Unchecked By Principle, Or The Love Of Glory, Is An Unruly Tyrant.

And As The Vicissitudes Of Nations Beget A Perpetual Tendency To The Accumulation Of Debt, There Ought To Be In Every Government A Perpetual, Anxious, And Unceasing Effort To Reduce That, Which At Any Times Exists, As Fast As Shall Be Practicable Consistently With Integrity And Good Faith.

It Was Remarked Yesterday That A Numerous Representation Was Necessary To Obtain The Confidence Of The People. This Is Not Generally True. The Confidence Of The People Will Easily Be Gained By A Good Administration. This Is The True Touchstone.

It Is In Vain To Hope To Guard Against Events Too Mighty For Human Foresight Or Precaution, And It Would Be Idle To Object To A Government Because It Could Not Perform Impossibilities.

A Treaty Cannot Be Made Which Alters The Constitution Of The Country, Or Which Infringes And Express Exceptions To The Power Of The Constitution.

If It Be Said That The Legislative Body Are Themselves The Constitutional Judges Of Their Own Powers, And That The Construction They Put Upon Them Is Conclusive Upon The Other Departments, It May Be Answered, That This Cannot Be The Natural Presumption, Where It Is Not Be Collected From Any Particular Provisions In The Constitution.

This Balance Between The National And State Governments Ought To Be Dwelt On With Peculiar Attention, As It Is Of The Utmost Importance. It Forms A Double Security To The People. If One Encroaches On Their Rights They Will Find A Powerful Protection In The Other. Indeed, They Will Both Be Prevented From Overpassing Their Constitutional Limits By A Certain Rivalship, Which Will Ever Subsist Between Them.

Men Are Rather Reasoning Than Reasonable Animals For The Most Part Governed By The Impulse Of Passion.

The Fabric Of American Empire Ought To Rest On The Solid Basis Of The Consent Of The People. The Streams Of National Power Ought To Flow From That Pure, Original Fountain Of All Legitimate Authority.

A Fondness For Power Is Implanted In Most Men, And It Is Natural To Abuse It When Acquired.

Unless Your Government Is Respectable, Foreigners Will Invade Your Rights; And To Maintain Tranquillity You Must Be Respectable; Even To Observe Neutrality You Must Have A Strong Government.

As The Duties Of Superintending The National Defense And Of Securing The Public Peace Against Foreign Or Domestic Violence Involve A Provision For Casualties And Dangers To Which No Possible Limits Can Be Assigned, The Power Of Making That Provision Ought To Know No Other Bounds Than The Exigencies Of The Nation And The Resources Of The Community.

Domestic Violence

The Idea Of Governing At All Times By The Simple Force Of Law (which We Have Been Told Is The Only Admissible Principle Of Republican Government) Has No Place But In The Reveries Of Those Political Doctors Whose Sagacity Disdains The Admonitions Of Experimental Instruction.

The Only Constitutional Exception To The Power Of Making Treaties Is, That It Shall Not Change The Constitution.… On Natural Principles, A Treaty, Which Should Manifestly Betray Or Sacrifice Primary Interests Of The State, Would Be Null.

A Garden, You Know, Is A Very Usual Refuge Of A Disappointed Politician. Accordingly, I Have Purchased A Few Acres About Nine Miles From Town, Have Built A House, And Am Cultivating A Garden.

The Prosecution [of Impeachments], Will Seldom Fail To Agitate The Passions Of The Whole Community, And To Divide It Into Parties More Or Less Friendly Or Inimical To The Accused. The Subjects Of Its Jurisdiction Are Those Offenses Which Proceed From The Misconduct Of Public Men, Or, In Other Words, From The Abuse Or Violation Of Some Public Trust, And They Relate Chiefly To Injuries Done Immediately To The Society Itself.

The States Have Authority To Interpret The Constitution, Enforce It, And Protect The People From Violations Of It By The Federal Government In The First Place, There Is Not A Syllable In The Plan Under Consideration Which Directly Empowers The National Courts To Construe The Laws According To The Spirit Of The Constitution, Or Which Gives Them Any Greater Latitude In This Respect Than May Be Claimed By The Courts Of Every State.

Remember Civil And Religious Liberty Always Go Together: If The Foundation Of The One Be Sapped, The Other Will Fall Of Course.

It Is A Well-known Fact That In Countries In Which The National Debt Is Properly Funded, And An Object Of Established Confidence, It Answers Most Of The Purposes Of Money. Transfers Of Stock, Or Public Debt, Are There Equivalent To Payments In Specie; Or, In Other Words, Stock, In The Principal Transactions Of Business, Passes Current As Specie. The Same Thing Would, In All Probability, Happen Here, Under The Like Circumstances.

It Is The Press Which Has Corrupted Our Political Morals - And It Is To The Press We Must Look For The Means Of Our Political Regeneration.

Effective Resistance To Usurpers Is Possible Only Provided The Citizens Understand Their Rights And Are Disposed To Defend Them.

The Local Interest Of A State Ought In Every Case To Give Way To The Interests Of The Union. For When A Sacrifice Of One Or The Other Is Necessary, The Former Becomes Only An Apparent, Partial Interest, And Should Yield, On The Principle That The Smaller Good Ought Never To Oppose The Greater Good.

In Testimony Of Their Respect For The Patriot Of Incorruptible Integrity, The Soldier Of Approved Valour The Statesman Of Consummate Wisdom; Whose Talents And Virtues Will Be Admired By Grateful Posterity Long After This Marble Shall Have Mouldered Into Dust.

The Christian Constitutional Society, Its Object Is First: The Support Of The Christian Religion. Second: The Support Of The United States.

There May Be In Every Government A Few Choice Spirits, Who May Act From More Worthy Motives. One Great Error Is That We Suppose Mankind More Honest Than They Are. Our Prevailing Passions Are Ambition And Interest.

It Will Be Of Little Avail To The People, That The Laws Are Made By Men Of Their Own Choice, If The Laws Be So Voluminous That They Cannot Be Read, Or So Incoherent That They Cannot Be Understood; If They Be Repealed Or Revised Before They Are Promulgated, Or Undergo Such Incessant Changes That No Man, Who Knows What The Law Is To-day, Can Guess What It Will Be Tomorrow.

If It Be Asked What Is To Restrain The House Of Representatives From Making Legal Discriminations In Favor Of Themselves And A Particular Class Of The Society? I Answer, The Genius Of The Whole System, The Nature Of Just And Constitutional Laws, And Above All The Vigilant And Manly Spirit Which Actuates The People Of America, A Spirit Which Nourishes Freedom, And In Return Is Nourished By It. If This Spirit Shall Ever Be So Far Debased As To Tolerate A Law Not Obligatory On The Legislature As Well As On The People, The People Will Be Prepared To Tolerate Anything But Liberty.

Industry Is Increased, Commodities Are Multiplied, Agriculture And Manufacturers Flourish: And Herein Consists The True Wealth And Prosperity Of A State.

The Safety Of A Republic Depends Essentially On The Energy Of A Common National Sentiment; On A Uniformity Of Principles And Habits; On The Exemption Of The Citizens From Foreign Bias And Prejudice; And On That Love Of Country Which Will Almost Invariably Be Found To Be Closely Connected With Birth, Education And Family.

Bias And Prejudice

Upon This Law, Depend The Natural Rights Of Mankind, The Supreme Being Gave Existence To Man, Together With The Means Of Preserving And Beatifying That Existence. He Endowed Him With Rational Faculties, By The Help Of Which, To Discern And Pursue Such Things, As Were Consistent With His Duty And Interest, And Invested Him With An Inviolable Right To Personal Liberty, And Personal Safety.

It Will Be Well To Advert To The Proportion Between The Objects That Will Require A Federal Provision In Respect To Revenue; And Those Which Will Require A State Provision. We Shall Discover That The Former Are Altogether Unlimited; And That The Latter Are Circumscribed Within Very Moderate Bounds.

It Is A Singular Advantage Of Taxes On Articles Of Consumption That They Contain In Their Own Nature A Security Against Excess. They Prescribe Their Own Limit, Which Cannot Be Exceeded Without Defeating The End Purposed - That Is, An Extension Of The Revenue.

The Instrument By Which It [government] Must Act Are Either The Authority Of The Laws Or Force. If The First Be Destroyed, The Last Must Be Substituted; And Where This Becomes The Ordinary Instrument Of Government There Is An End To Liberty!

If It Were To Be Asked, What Is The Most Sacred Duty And The Greatest Source Of Our Security In A Republic? The Answer Would Be, An Inviolable Respect For The Constitution And Laws - The First Growing Out Of The Last . . . . A Sacred Respect For The Constitutional Law Is The Vital Principle, The Sustaining Energy Of A Free Government.

The Vigour Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty. . . . A Dangerous Ambition More Often Lurks Behind The Specious Mask Of Zeal For The Rights Of The People, Than Under The Forbidding Appearance Of Zeal For The Firmness And Efficiency Of Government.

There Is No Part Of The Administration Of Government That Requires Extensive Information And A Thorough Knowledge Of The Principles Of Political Economy, So Much As The Business Of Taxation. The Man Who Understands Those Principles Best Will Be Least Likely To Resort To Oppressive Expedients, Or Sacrifice Any Particular Class Of Citizens To The Procurement Of Revenue. It Might Be Demonstrated That The Most Productive System Of Finance Will Always Be The Least Burdensome.

Thorough Knowledge

There Can Be No Time, No State Of Things, In Which Credit Is Not Essential To A Nation.

To Model Our Political System Upon Speculations Of Lasting Tranquility, Is To Calculate On The Weaker Springs Of The Human Character.

Credit Supposes Specific And Permanent Funds For The Punctual Payment Of Interest, With A Moral Certainty Of A Final Redemption Of The Principal.

For My Part, I Sincerely Esteem The Constitution, A System Which Without The Finger Of God, Never Could Have Been Suggested And Agreed Upon By Such A Diversity Of Interests.

There Are Still To Be Found Visionary Or Designing Men, Who Stand Ready To Advocate The Paradox Of Perpetual Peace Between The States, Though Dismembered And Alienated From Each Other.... The Genius Of Republics, Say They, Is Pacific; The Spirit Of Commerce Has A Tendency To Soften The Manners Of Men, And To Extinguish Those Inflammable Humours Which Have So Often Kindled Into Wars. Commercial Republics, Like Ours, Will Never Be Disposed To Waste Themselves In Ruinous Contentions With Each Other. They Will Be Governed By Mutual Interest, And Will Cultivate A Spirit Of Mutual Amity And Concord.

Mutual Interest

I Have Thought It My Duty To Exhibit Things As They Are, Not As They Ought To Be.

A Promise Must Never Be Broken.

There Are Seasons In Every Country When Noise And Impudence Pass Current For Worth; And In Popular Commotions Especially, The Clamors Of Interested And Factious Men Are Often Mistaken For Patriotism.

It Equally Proves, That Though Individual Oppression May Now And Then Proceed From The Courts Of Justice, The General Liberty Of The People Can Never Be Endangered From That Quarter; I Mean So Long As The Judiciary Remains Truly Distinct From Both The Legislature And The Executive. For I Agree, That "there Is No Liberty, If The Power Of Judging Be Not Separated From The Legislative And Executive Powers." And It Proves, In The Last Place, That As Liberty Can Have Nothing To Fear From The Judiciary Alone, But Would Have Every Thing To Fear From Its Union With Either Of The Other Departments.

Experience Is The Oracle Of Truth; And Where Its Responses Are Unequivocal, They Ought To Be Conclusive And Sacred.

Happy Will It Be For Ourselves, And Most Honorable For Human Nature, If We Have Wisdom And Virtue Enough To Set So Glorious An Example To Mankind!

... For It Is A Truth, Which The Experience Of All Ages Has Attested, That The People Are Commonly Most In Danger When The Means Of Insuring Their Rights Are In The Possession Of Those Of Whom They Entertain The Least Suspicion.

The Same State Of The Passions Which Fits The Multitude, Who Have Not A Sufficient Stock Of Reason And Knowledge To Guide Them, For Opposition To Tyranny And Oppression, Very Naturally Leads Them To A Contempt And Disregard Of All Authority.

But The Greatest Obstacle Of All To The Successful Prosecution Of A New Branch Of Industry In A Country, In Which It Was Before Unknown, Consists . . . In The Bounties, Premiums, And Other Aids Which Are Granted, In A Variety Of Cases, By The Nations, In Which The Establishments To Be Imitated Are Previously Introduced.

The Laws Of Congress Are Restricted To A Certain Sphere, And When They Depart From This Sphere, They Are No Longer Supreme Or Binding.

I Should Esteem It The Extreme Of Imprudence To Prolong The Precarious State Of Our National Affairs, And To Expose The Union To The Jeopardy Of Successive Experiments, In The Chimerical Pursuit Of A Perfect Plan. I Never Expect To See A Perfect Work From Imperfect Man. The Result Of The Deliberations Of All Collective Bodies Must Necessarily Be A Compound, As Well Of The Errors And Prejudices, As Of The Good Sense And Wisdom, Of The Individuals Of Whom They Are Composed.

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