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If It Be Asked What Is To Restrain The House Of Representatives From Making Legal Discriminations In Favor Of Themselves And A Particular Class Of The Society? I Answer, The Genius Of The Whole System, The Nature Of Just And Constitutional Laws, And Above All The Vigilant And Manly Spirit Which Actuates The People Of America, A Spirit Which Nourishes Freedom, And In Return Is Nourished By It. If This Spirit Shall Ever Be So Far Debased As To Tolerate A Law Not Obligatory On The Legislature As Well As On The People, The People Will Be Prepared To Tolerate Anything But Liberty.

-Alexander Hamilton

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If It Be Asked

Alexander Hamilton

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If It Be Asked What Is To Restrain The House Of Representatives From Making Legal Discriminations In Favor Of Themselves And A Particular Class Of The Society? I Answer, The Genius Of The Whole System, The Nature Of Just And Constitutional Laws, And Above All The Vigilant And Manly Spirit Which Actuates The People Of America, A Spirit Which Nourishes Freedom, And In Return Is Nourished By It. If This Spirit Shall Ever Be So Far Debased As To Tolerate A Law Not Obligatory On The Legislature As Well As On The People, The People Will Be Prepared To Tolerate Anything But Liberty.

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The Institution Of Delegated Power Implies That There Is A Portion Of Virtue And Honor Among Mankind Which May Be A Reasonable Foundation Of Confidence.

One Great Error Is That We Suppose Mankind More Honest Than They Are.

Hitherto My Observations Have Only Aimed At A Vindication Of The Provision In Question, On The Ground Of Theoretic Propriety . . . . But There Remains To Be Mentioned A Positive Advantage . . . I Allude To The Circumstance Of Uniformity In The Time Of Elections For The House Of Representatives. It Is More Than Possible, That This Uniformity May Be Found By Experience To Be Of Great Importance To The Public Welfare; Both As A Security Against The Perpetuation Of The Same Spirit In The Body; And As A Cure For The Diseases Of Faction.

The States Have Authority To Interpret The Constitution, Enforce It, And Protect The People From Violations Of It By The Federal Government In The First Place, There Is Not A Syllable In The Plan Under Consideration Which Directly Empowers The National Courts To Construe The Laws According To The Spirit Of The Constitution, Or Which Gives Them Any Greater Latitude In This Respect Than May Be Claimed By The Courts Of Every State.

There May Be In Every Government A Few Choice Spirits, Who May Act From More Worthy Motives. One Great Error Is That We Suppose Mankind More Honest Than They Are. Our Prevailing Passions Are Ambition And Interest.

I Go Further, And Affirm That Bills Of Rights, In The Sense And To The Extent In Which They Are Contended For, Are Not Only Unnecessary In The Proposed Constitution, But Would Even Be Dangerous. They Would Contain Various Exceptions To Powers Not Granted; And On This Very Account, Would Afford A Colorable Pretext To Claim More Than Were Granted. For Why Declare That Things Shall Not Be Done Which There Is No Power To Do?

It Was Remarked Yesterday That A Numerous Representation Was Necessary To Obtain The Confidence Of The People. This Is Not Generally True. The Confidence Of The People Will Easily Be Gained By A Good Administration. This Is The True Touchstone.

Give Me The Steady, Uniform, Unshaken Security Of Constitutional Freedom. Give Me The Right To Be Tried By A Jury Of My Own Neighbors, And To Be Taxed By My Own Representatives Only. What Will Become Of The Law And Courts Of Justice Without This? The Shadow May Remain, But The Substance Will Be Gone. I Would Die To Preserve The Law Upon A Solid Foundation; But Take Away Liberty, And The Foundation Is Destroyed.

But The Greatest Obstacle Of All To The Successful Prosecution Of A New Branch Of Industry In A Country, In Which It Was Before Unknown, Consists . . . In The Bounties, Premiums, And Other Aids Which Are Granted, In A Variety Of Cases, By The Nations, In Which The Establishments To Be Imitated Are Previously Introduced.

Experience Is The Oracle Of Truth; And Where Its Responses Are Unequivocal, They Ought To Be Conclusive And Sacred.

We Are Attempting, By This Constitution, To Abolish Factions, And To Unite All Parties For The General Welfare.

It Has Been Frequently Remarked, That It Seems To Have Been Reserved To The People Of This Country To Decide, By Their Conduct And Example, The Important Question, Whether Societies Of Men Are Really Capable Or Not, Of Establishing Good Government From Reflection And Choice, Or Whether They Are Forever Destined To Depend, For Their Political Constitutions, On Accident And Force.

The Treaties Of The United States, To Have Any Force At All, Must Be Considered As Part Of The Law Of The Land.

What Is The Most Sacred Duty And The Greatest Source Of Our Security In A Republic? An Inviolable Respect For The Constitution And Laws.

[t]he Constitution Ought To Be The Standard Of Construction For The Laws, And That Wherever There Is An Evident Opposition, The Laws Ought To Give Place To The Constitution. But This Doctrine Is Not Deducible From Any Circumstance Peculiar To The Plan Of Convention, But From The General Theory Of A Limited Constitution.

With Regard To The Learned Professions, Little Need Be Observed; They Truly Form No Distinct Interest In Society . . . [discussing The Landed, Merchant, And Learned Classes In Legislative Assembly]. Will Not The Man Of The Learned Profession, Who Will Feel A Neutrality To The Rivalships Between The Different Branches Of Industry, Be Likely To Prove An Impartial Arbiter Between Them, Ready To Promote Either, So Far As It Shall Appear To Him Conducive To The General Interests Of Society?

[w]e Must Extend The Authority Of The Union To The Persons Of The Citizens - The Only Proper Objects Of Government.

Necessity, Especially In Politics, Often Occasions False Hopes, False Reasonings, And A System Of Measures, Correspondingly Erroneous.

It Is Astonishing That So Simple A Truth Should Ever Have Had An Adversary; And It Is One Among A Multitude Of Proofs, How Apt A Spirit Of Ill-informed Jealousy, Or Of Too Great Abstraction And Refinement Is To Lead Men Astray From The Plainest Paths Of Reason And Conviction.

It Will Be Well To Advert To The Proportion Between The Objects That Will Require A Federal Provision In Respect To Revenue; And Those Which Will Require A State Provision. We Shall Discover That The Former Are Altogether Unlimited; And That The Latter Are Circumscribed Within Very Moderate Bounds.

Ambition Without Principle Never Was Long Under The Guidance Of Good Sense.

The Liberty Of The Press Consists In The Right To Publish With Impunity Truth With Good Motives For Justifiable Ends, Though Reflecting On Government, Magistracy, Or Individuals.

If Duties Are Too High, They Lessen The Consumption; The Collection Is Eluded; And The Product To The Treasury Is Not So Great As When They Are Confined Within Proper And Moderate Bounds. This Forms A Complete Barrier Against Any Material Oppression Of The Citizens By Taxes Of This Class, And Is Itself A Natural Limitation Of The Power Of Imposing Them.

It's Not Tyranny We Desire; It's A Just, Limited, Federal Government.

Every Power Vested In A Government Is In Its Nature Sovereign, And Includes By Force Of The Term A Right To Employ All The Means Requisite . . . To The Attainment Of The Ends Of Such Power.

The Inhabitants Of Territories, Often The Theatre Of War, Are Unavoidably Subject To Frequent Infringements On Their Rights, Which Serve To Weaken Their Sense Of Those Rights; And By Degrees, The People Are Brought To Consider The Soldiery Not Only As Their Protectors But As Their Superiors.

For, When The Credit Of A Country Is In Any Degree Questionable, It Never Fails To Give On Extravagant Premium, In One Shape Or Another, Upon All The Loans It Has Occasion To Make. Nor Does The Evil End Here; The Same Disadvantage Must Be Sustained Upon Whatever Is To Be Bought On Terms Of Future Payment. From This Constant Necessity Of Borrowing And Buying Dear, It Is Easy To Conceive How Immensely The Expenses Of A Nation, In A Course Of Time, Will Be Augmented By An Unsound State Of The Public Credit.

These Are Not Vague Inferences . . . But They Are Solid Conclusions Drawn From The Natural And Necessary Progress Of Human Affairs.

The Sacred Rights Of Mankind Are Not To Be Rummaged For Among Old Parchments Or Musty Records. They Are Written, As With A Sunbeam, In The Whole Volume Of Human Nature, By The Hand Of The Divinity Itself; And Can Never Be Erased.

It May Safely Be Received As An Axiom In Our Political System, That The State Governments Will In All Possible Contingencies Afford Complete Security Against Invasions Of The Public Liberty By The National Authority.

The President Is To Be Commander-in-chief Of The Army And Navy Of The United States. In This Respect His Authority Would Be Nominally The Same With That Of The King Of Great Britain, But In Substance Much Inferior To It. It Would Amount To Nothing More Than The Supreme Command And Direction Of The Land And Naval Forces, As First General And Admiral ... While That Of The British King Extends To The Declaring Of War And To The Raising And Regulating Of Fleets And Armies - All Which, By The Constitution Under Consideration, Would Appertain To The Legislature.

Money Is, With Propriety, Considered As The Vital Principle Of The Body Politic; As That Which Sustains Its Life And Motion, And Enables It To Perform Its Most Essential Functions.

The Injury Which May Possibly Be Done By Defeating A Few Good Laws, Will Be Amply Compensated By The Advantage Of Preventing A Number Of Bad Ones.

Nothing Can Be More Evident, Than That An Exclusive Power Of Regulating Elections For The National Government, In The Hands Of The State Legislatures, Would Leave The Existence Of The Union Entirely At Their Mercy . . . . It Is To Little Purpose To Say That A Neglect Or Omission Of This Kind [not Letting The Feds Have Elections], Would Be Unlikely To Take Place. The Constitutional Possibility Of The Thing, Without An Equivalent For The Risk, Is An Unanswerable Objection.

This Process Of Election Affords A Moral Certainty That The Office Of President Will Seldom Fall To The Lot Of Any Many Who Is Not In An Eminent Degree Endowed With The Requisite Qualifications.

Common Interest May Always Be Reckoned Upon As The Surest Bond Of Sympathy.

When A Government Betrays The People By Amassing Too Much Power And Becoming Tyrannical, The People Have No Choice But To Exercise Their Original Right Of Self-defense — To Fight The Government.

The Constitution Of Human Nature" Teaches Us Not To Expect "that The Persons, Entrusted With The Administration Of The Affairs Of The Particular Members Of A Confederacy, Will At All Times Be Ready, With Perfect Good Humor, And An Unbiased Regard To The Public Weal, To Execute The Resolutions Of Decrees Of The General Authority." "this Tendency Is Not Difficult To Be Accounted For," Publius Argues, "it Has Its Origin In The Love Of Power.

As The Duties Of Superintending The National Defense And Of Securing The Public Peace Against Foreign Or Domestic Violence Involve A Provision For Casualties And Dangers To Which No Possible Limits Can Be Assigned, The Power Of Making That Provision Ought To Know No Other Bounds Than The Exigencies Of The Nation And The Resources Of The Community.

Domestic Violence

Man Is Either Governed By His Own Laws - Freedom - Or The Laws Of Another - Slavery. Are You Willing To Become Slaves? Will You Give Up Your Freedom, Your Life And Your Property Without A Single Struggle? No Man Has A Right To Rule Over His Fellow Creatures.

There Can Be No Profit In The Making Or Selling Of Things To Be Destroyed In War. Men May Think That They Have Such Profit, But In The End The Profit Will Turn Out To Be A Loss.

The Increasing Remoteness Of Consanguinity Is Everyday Diminishing The Force Of The Family Compact Between France And Spain. And Politicians Have Ever With Great Reason Considered The Ties Of Blood As Feeble And Precarious Links Of Political Connection.

The Deliberative Sense Of The Community Should Govern.

The Love For Our Native Land Strengthens Our Individual And National Character.

Now, Mark My Words. So Long As We Are A Young And Virtuous People, This Instument Will Bind Us Together In Mutual Interests, Mutual Welfare, And Mutual Happiness. But When We Become Old And Corrupt, It Will Bind No Longer.

Mutual Interest

Opinion, Whether Well Or Ill-founded, Is The Governing Principle Of Human Affairs

The Laws Of Certain States . . . Give An Ownership In The Service Of Negroes As Personal Property . . . . But Being Men, By The Laws Of God And Nature, They Were Capable Of Acquiring Liberty - And When The Captor In War . . . Thought Fit To Give Them Liberty, The Gift Was Not Only Valid, But Irrevocable.

When Men, Engaged In Unjustifiable Pursuits, Are Aware That Obstructions May Come From A Quarter Which Bare Apprehension Of Opposition From Doing What They Would With Eagerness Rush Into If No Such External Impediments Were To Be Feared.

The Prosperity Of Commerce Is Now Perceived And Acknowledged By All Enlightened Statesmen To Be The Most Useful As Well As The Most Productive Source Of National Wealth, And Has Accordingly Become A Primary Object Of Their Political Cares.

Were It Not That It Might Require Too Long A Discussion, It Would Not Be Difficult To Demonstrate That A Large And Well-organized Republic Can Scarcely Lose Its Liberty From Any Other Cause Than That Of Anarchy, To Which A Contempt Of The Laws Is The High-road.

Let Experience, The Least Fallible Guide Of Human Opinion, Be Appealed To For An Answer To These Inquiries.

In All General Questions Which Become The Subjects Of Discussion, There Are Always Some Truths Mixed With Falsehoods. I Confess, There Is Danger Where Men Are Capable Of Holding Two Offices. Take Mankind In General, They Are Vicious, Their Passions May Be Operated Upon. We Have Been Taught To Reprobate The Danger Of Influence In The British Government, Without Duly Reflecting How Far It Was Necessary To Support A Good Government. We Have Taken Up Many Ideas Upon Trust, And At Last, Pleased With Our Own Opinions, Establish Them As Undoubted Truths.

A Powerful, Victorious Ally Is Yet Another Name For Master.

It Will Be Forgotten, On The One Hand, That Jealousy Is The Usual Concomitant Of Violent Love, And That The Noble Enthusiasm Of Liberty Is Too Apt To Be Infected With A Spirit Of Narrow And Illiberal Distrust. On The Other Hand, It Will Be Equally Forgotten, That The Vigour Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty.

They Are Not Rules Prescribed By The Sovereign To The Subject, But Agreements Between Sovereign And Sovereign.

Men Are Rather Reasoning Than Reasonable Animals For The Most Part Governed By The Impulse Of Passion.

The Courts Must Declare The Sense Of The Law; And If They Should Be Disposed To Exercise Will Instead Of Judgement; The Consequences Would Be The Substitution Of Their Pleasure For That Of The Legislative Body.

The Awful Discretion, Which A Court Of Impeachments Must Necessarily Have, To Doom To Honor Or To Infamy The Most Confidential And The Most Distinguished Characters Of The Community, Forbids The Commitment Of The Trust To A Small Number Of Persons.

Some Reasonable Term Ought To Be Allowed To Enable Aliens To Get Rid Of Foreign And Acquire American Attachments; To Learn The Principles And Imbibe The Spirit Of Our Government; And To Admit Of A Probability At Least, Of Their Feeling A Real Interest In Our Affairs.

Allow A Government To Decline Paying Its Debts And You Overthrow All Public Morality-you Unhinge All The Principles That Preserve The Limits Of Free Constitutions. Nothing Can More Affect National Prosperity Than A Constant And Systematic Attention To Extinguish The Present Debt And To Avoid As Much As Possibly The Incurring Of Any New Debt.

The People Are Turbulent And Changing; They Seldom Judge Right Or Make Good Decision.

It Is In Vain To Hope To Guard Against Events Too Mighty For Human Foresight Or Precaution, And It Would Be Idle To Object To A Government Because It Could Not Perform Impossibilities.

If The Exercise Of Power Of Internal Taxation By The Union Should Be Discovered On Experiment To Be Really Inconvenient, The Federal Government May Then Forbear The Use Of It . . .

A Treaty Cannot Be Made Which Alters The Constitution Of The Country, Or Which Infringes And Express Exceptions To The Power Of The Constitution.

[s]ound Policy Condemns The Practice Of Accumulating Debts.

The Reasonableness Of The Agency Of The National Courts In Cases In Which The State Tribunals Cannot Be Supposed To Be Impartial, Speaks For Itself. No Man Ought Certainly To Be A Judge In His Own Cause, Or In Any Cause In Respect To Which He Has The Least Interest Or Bias.

It Is Impossible Not To Bestow The Imputation Of Deliberate Imposture And Deception Upon The Gross Pretense Of A Similitude Between A King Of Great Britain And A Magistrate Of The Character Marked Out For That Of The President Of The United States. It Is Still More Impossible To Withhold That Imputation From The Rash And Barefaced Expedients Which Have Been Employed To Give Success To The Attempted Imposition.

In The Usual Progress Of Things, The Necessities Of A Nation In Every Stage Of Its Existence Will Be Found At Least Equal To Its Resources.

. . . [the Judicial Branch] May Truly Be Said To Have Neither Force Nor Will, But Merely Judgment; And Must Ultimately Depend Upon The Aid Of The Executive Arm Even For The Efficacy Of Its Judgments.

The Powers Contained In A Constitution...ought To Be Construed Liberally In Advancement Of The Public Good.

Government Is Frequently And Aptly Classed Under Two Descriptions-a Government Of Force, And A Government Of Laws; The First Is The Definition Of Despotism-the Last, Of Liberty.

It Is The Press Which Has Corrupted Our Political Morals - And It Is To The Press We Must Look For The Means Of Our Political Regeneration.

The Power Of Creating New Funds Upon New Objects Of Taxation, By Its Own Authority, Would Enable The National Government To Borrow As Far As Its Necessities Might Require.

I Propose . . . . The Conformity Of The Proposed Constitution To The True Principles Of Republican Government.

Republican Government

As Riches Increase And Accumulate In Few Hands . . . The Tendency Of Things Will Be To Depart From The Republican Standard.

It Will Be Of Little Avail To The People, That The Laws Are Made By Men Of Their Own Choice, If The Laws Be So Voluminous That They Cannot Be Read, Or So Incoherent That They Cannot Be Understood; If They Be Repealed Or Revised Before They Are Promulgated, Or Undergo Such Incessant Changes That No Man, Who Knows What The Law Is To-day, Can Guess What It Will Be Tomorrow.

Jurors Should Acquit, Even Against The Judge's Instruction . . . If Exercising Their Judgment With Discretion And Honesty They Have A Clear Conviction The Charge Of The Court Is Wrong.

...that Standing Army Can Never Be Formidable (threatening) To The Liberties Of The People, While There Is A Large Body Of Citizens, Little If At All Inferior To Them In The Use Of Arms.

Establish That A Government May Decline A Provision For Its Debts, Though Able To Make It, And You Overthrow All Public Morality, You Unhinge All The Principles That Must Preserve The Limits Of Free Constitutions.

A Garden, You Know, Is A Very Usual Refuge Of A Disappointed Politician. Accordingly, I Have Purchased A Few Acres About Nine Miles From Town, Have Built A House, And Am Cultivating A Garden.

Americans Rouse - Be Unanimous, Be Virtuous, Be Firm, Exert Your Courage, Trust In Heaven, And Nobly Defy The Enemies Both Of God And Man!

The Changes In The Human Condition Are Uncertain And Frequent. Many, On Whom Fortune Has Bestowed Her Favours, May Trace Their Family To A More Unprosperous Station; And Many Who Are Now In Obscurity, May Look Back Upon The Affluence And Exalted Rank Of Their Ancestors.

This [a State Militia System] Appears To Me The Only Substitute That Can Be Devised For A Standing Army, And The Best Possible Security Against It, If It Should Exist.

Second Amendment

Right To Bear Arms

It Has Been Observed That A Pure Democracy If It Were Practicable Would Be The Most Perfect Government. Experience Has Proved That No Position Is More False Than This. The Ancient Democracies In Which The People Themselves Deliberated Never Possessed One Good Feature Of Government. Their Very Character Was Tyranny; Their Figure Deformity.

Democracies Have

It Is An Unquestionable Truth, That The Body Of The People In Every Country Desire Sincerely Its Prosperity. But It Is Equally Unquestionable That They Do Not Possess The Discernment And Stability Necessary For Systematic Government. To Deny That They Are Frequently Led Into The Grossest Of Errors, By Misinformation And Passion, Would Be A Flattery Which Their Own Good Sense Must Despise.

The Achaeans Soon Experienced, As Often Happens, That A Victorious And Powerful Ally Is But Another Name For A Master.

The Practice Of Arbitrary Imprisonments Have Been, In All Ages, The Favorite And Most Formidable Instruments Of Tyranny.

Nothing Could Be More Ill-judged Than That Intolerant Spirit Which Has, At All Times, Characterized Political Parties.

The Experience Of Treaties Being Broken With Impunity Provide An Afflicting Lesson To Mankind How Little Dependence Is To Be Placed On Treaties Which Have No Other Sanction Than The Obligations Of Good Faith; And Which Oppose General Considerations Of Peace And Justice To The Impulse Of Any Immediate Interest And Passion.

Manufacturing Establishments Not Only Occasion A Positive Augmentation Of The Produce And Revenue Of The Society . . . They Contribute Essentially To Rendering Them Greater Than They Could Possibly Be, Without Such Establishments. These Circumstances Are . . . Greater Scope For The Diversity Of Talents And Dispositions Which Discriminate Men From Each Other.

This Balance Between The National And State Governments Ought To Be Dwelt On With Peculiar Attention, As It Is Of The Utmost Importance. It Forms A Double Security To The People. If One Encroaches On Their Rights They Will Find A Powerful Protection In The Other. Indeed, They Will Both Be Prevented From Overpassing Their Constitutional Limits By A Certain Rivalship, Which Will Ever Subsist Between Them.

The Laws Of Congress Are Restricted To A Certain Sphere, And When They Depart From This Sphere, They Are No Longer Supreme Or Binding.

To Judge From The History Of Mankind, We Shall Be Compelled To Conclude, That The Fiery And Destructive Passions Of War, Reign In The Human Breast, With Much More Powerful Sway, Than The Mild And Beneficent Sentiments Of Peace.

The Regular Distribution Of Power Into Distinct Departments; The Introduction Of Legislative Balances And Checks; The Institution Of Courts Composed Of Judges Holding Their Offices During Good Behavior; The Representation Of The People In The Legislature By Deputies Of Their Own Election . . . They Are Means, And Powerful Means, By Which The Excellences Of Republican Government May Be Retained And Its Imperfections Lessened Or Avoided.

Distribution Of Power

Good Constitutions Are Formed Upon A Comparison Of The Liberty Of The Individual With The Strength Of Government: If The Tone Of Either Be Too High, The Other Will Be Weakened Too Much. It Is The Happiest Possible Mode Of Conciliating These Objects, To Institute One Branch Peculiarly Endowed With Sensibility, Another With Knowledge And Firmness. Through The Opposition And Mutual Control Of These Bodies, The Government Will Reach, In Its Regular Operations, The Perfect Balance Between Liberty And Power.

War, Like Most Other Things, Is A Science To Be Acquired And Perfected By Diligence, By Perserverance, By Time, And By Practice.

Tyranny Has Perhaps Oftener Grown Out Of The Assumptions Of Power, Called For, On Pressing Exigencies, By A Defective Constitution, Than Out Of The Full Exercise Of The Largest Constitutional Authorities.

States, Like Individuals, Who Observe Their Engagements, Are Respected And Trusted: While The Reverse Is The Fate Of Those Who Pursue An Opposite Conduct.

Learn To Think Continentally.

Government Implies The Power Of Making Laws. It Is Essential To The Idea Of A Law, That It Be Attended With A Sanction; Or, In Other Words, A Penalty Or Punishment For Disobedience.

Nothing Is More Natural To Men In Office, Than To Look With Peculiar Deference Towards That Authority To Which They Owe Their Official Existence.

In A Free Government, The Security For Civil Rights Must Be The Same As That For Religious Rights. It Consists In The One Case In The Multiplicity Of Interests, And In The Other In The Multiplicity Of Sects.

Hence, In A State Of Nature, No Man Had Any Moral Power To Deprive Another Of His Life, Limbs, Property, Or Liberty; Nor The Least Authority To Command Or Exact Obedience From Him, Except That Which Arose From The Ties Of Consanguinity.

For My Part, I Sincerely Esteem The Constitution, A System Which Without The Finger Of God, Never Could Have Been Suggested And Agreed Upon By Such A Diversity Of Interests.

The Instrument By Which It [government] Must Act Are Either The Authority Of The Laws Or Force. If The First Be Destroyed, The Last Must Be Substituted; And Where This Becomes The Ordinary Instrument Of Government There Is An End To Liberty!

Credit Supposes Specific And Permanent Funds For The Punctual Payment Of Interest, With A Moral Certainty Of A Final Redemption Of The Principal.

Every Nation Ought To Have A Right To Provide For Its Own Happiness.

In Testimony Of Their Respect For The Patriot Of Incorruptible Integrity, The Soldier Of Approved Valour The Statesman Of Consummate Wisdom; Whose Talents And Virtues Will Be Admired By Grateful Posterity Long After This Marble Shall Have Mouldered Into Dust.

Whoever Attentively Considers The Different Departments Of Power Must Perceive, That, In A Government In Which They Are Separated From Each Other, The Judiciary, From The Nature Of Its Functions, Will Always Be The Least Dangerous To The Political Rights Of The Constitution; Because It Will Be Least In A Capacity To Annoy Or Injure Them.

I Have Carefully Examined The Evidences Of The Christian Religion, And If I Was Sitting As A Juror Upon Its Authenticity I Would Unhesitatingly Give My Verdict In Its Favor. I Can Prove Its Truth As Clearly As Any Proposition Ever Submitted To The Mind Of Man.

If It Were To Be Asked, What Is The Most Sacred Duty And The Greatest Source Of Our Security In A Republic? The Answer Would Be, An Inviolable Respect For The Constitution And Laws - The First Growing Out Of The Last . . . . A Sacred Respect For The Constitutional Law Is The Vital Principle, The Sustaining Energy Of A Free Government.

In All Very Numerous Assemblies, Of Whatever Character Composed, Passion Never Fails To Wrest The Sceptre From Reason. Had Every Athenian Citizen Been A Socrates, Every Athenian Assembly Would Still Have Been A Mob.

There Are Some Who Maintain That Trade Will Regulate Itself, And It Is Not To Be Benefited By The Encouragements Or Restraints Of Government. Such Persons Will Imagine That There Is No Need Of A Common Directing Power. This Is One Of Those Wild Speculative Paradoxes, Which Have Grown Into Credit Among Us, Contrary To The Uniform Practice And Sense Of The Most Enlightened Nations.

It Equally Proves, That Though Individual Oppression May Now And Then Proceed From The Courts Of Justice, The General Liberty Of The People Can Never Be Endangered From That Quarter; I Mean So Long As The Judiciary Remains Truly Distinct From Both The Legislature And The Executive. For I Agree, That "there Is No Liberty, If The Power Of Judging Be Not Separated From The Legislative And Executive Powers." And It Proves, In The Last Place, That As Liberty Can Have Nothing To Fear From The Judiciary Alone, But Would Have Every Thing To Fear From Its Union With Either Of The Other Departments.

That This Gentleman [president John Adams] Ought Not To Be The Object Of The Federal Wish, Is, With Me, Reduced To Demonstration. His Administration Has Already Very Materially Disgraced And Sunk The Government. There Are Defects In His Character Which Must Inevitably Continue To Do This More And More. And If He Is Supported By The Federal Party, His Party Must In The Issue Fall With Him.

What Bitter Anguish Would Not The People Of Athens Have Often Escaped If Their Government Had Contained So Provident A Safeguard Against Tyranny Of Their Own Passions? Popular Liberty Might Then Have Escaped The Indelible Reproach Of Decreeing To The Same Citizens The Hemlock On One Day And Statutes The Next.

[t]hough Individual Oppression May Now And Then Proceed Fro The Courts Of Justice, The General Liberty Of The People Can Never Be Endangered From That Quarter . . .

The Administration Of Private Justice Between The Citizens Of The Same State, The Supervision Of Agriculture And Of Other Concerns Of A Similar Nature, All Those Things In Short Which Are Proper To Be Provided For By Local Legislation, Can Never Be Desirable Cares Of A General Jurisdiction . . . The Attempt To Exercise These Powers Would Be As Troublesome As It Would Be Nugatory; And The Possession Of Them, For That Reason, Would Contribute Nothing To The Dignity, To The Importance, Or To The Splendour Of The National Government.

The Inquiry Constantly Is What Will Please, Not What Will Benefit The People. In Such A Government There Can Be Nothing But Temporary Expedient, Fickleness, And Folly.

The Obscurity Is Much Oftener In The Passions And Prejudices Of The Reasoner Than In The Subject.

A Struggle For Liberty Is In Itself Respectable And Glorious. . . . When Conducted With Magnanimity, Justice And Humanity, It Ought To Command The Admiration Of Every Friend To Human Nature. But If Sullied By Crimes And Extravagancies, It Loses Its Respectability.

A Fondness For Power Is Implanted In Most Men, And It Is Natural To Abuse It When Acquired. This Maxim, Drawn From The Experience Of All Ages, Makes It The Height Of Folly To Intrust Any Set Of Men With Power Which Is Not Under Every Possible Control; Perpetual Strides Are Made After More As Long As There Is Any Part Withheld.

To Attach Full Confidence To An Institution Of This Nature, It Appears To Be An Essential Ingredient In Its Structure, That It Shall Be Under Private And Not A Public Direction-under The Guidance Of Individual Interest, Not Of Public Policy; Which, Would Be . . . Liable To Being Too Much Influenced By Public Necessity.

Would There Not Be The Greatest Reason To Apprehend, That Error In The First Sentence Would Be The Parent Of Error In The Second Sentence? That The Strong Bias Of One Decision Would Be Apt To Overrule The Influence Of Any New Lights, Which Might Be Brought To Vary The Complexion Of Another Decision? Those, Who Know Any Thing Of Human Nature, Will Not Hesitate To Answer These Questions In The Affirmative.

These Powers Ought To Exist Without Limitation, Because It Is Impossible To Foresee Or To Define The Extent And Variety Of National Exigencies, And The Correspondent Extent And Variety Of The Means Which May Be Necessary To Satisfy Them.

There Are Seasons In Every Country When Noise And Impudence Pass Current For Worth; And In Popular Commotions Especially, The Clamors Of Interested And Factious Men Are Often Mistaken For Patriotism.

People Sometimes Attribute My Success To My Genius; All The Genius I Know Anything About Is Hard Work.

I Have Thought It My Duty To Exhibit Things As They Are, Not As They Ought To Be.

Of All The Cares Or Concerns Of Government, The Direction Of War Most Peculiarly Demands Those Qualities Which Distinguish The Exercise Of Power By A Single Hand. The Direction Of War Implies The Direction Of The Common Strength; And The Power Of Directing And Employing The Common Strength, Forms A Usual And Essential Part In The Definition Of The Executive Authority.

When Human Laws Contradict Or Discountenance The Means, Which Are Necessary To Preserve The Essential Rights Of Any Society, They Defeat The Proper End Of All Laws, And So Become Null And Void.

The Complete Independence Of The Courts Of Justice Is Peculiarly Essential In A Limited Constitution. By A Limited Constitution, I Understand One Which Contains Certain Specified Exceptions To The Legislative Authority. Limitations Of This Kind Can Be Preserved In Practice No Other Way Than Through The Medium Of Courts Of Justice, Whose Duty It Must Be To Declare All Acts Contrary To The Manifest Tenor Of The Constitution Void. Without This, All The Reservations Of Particular Rights Or Privileges Would Amount To Nothing.

In This Distribution Of Powers The Wisdom Of Our Constitution Is Manifested. It Is The Province And Duty Of The Executive To Preserve To The Nation The Blessings Of Peace. The Legislature Alone Can Interrupt Those Blessings, By Placing The Nation In A State Of War.

Distribution Of Power

Take Mankind As They Are, And What Are They Governed By? Their Passions.

A Republic Of This Kind, Able To Withstand An External Force, May Support Itself Without Any Internal Corruptions. The Form Of This Society Prevents All Manner Of Inconveniences.

There Is Something So Far-fetched And So Extravagant In The Idea Of Danger To Liberty From The Militia That One Is At A Loss Whether To Treat It With Gravity Or With Raillery; Whether To Consider It As A Mere Trial Of Skill, Like The Paradoxes Of Rhetoricians; As A Disingenuous Artifice To Instil Prejudices At Any Price; Or As The Serious.

The Spirit Of Enterprise, Which Characterizes The Commercial Part Of America, Has Left No Occasion Of Displaying Itself Unimproved. It Is Not At All Probable That This Unbridled Spirit Would Pay Much Respect To Those Regulations Of Trade By Which Particular States Might Endeavor To Secure Exclusive Benefits To Their Own Citizens.

The Variety Of More Minute Interests, Which Will Necessarily Fall Under The Superintendence Of The Local Administrations . . . Cannot Be Particularized Without Involving A Detail Too Tedious And Uninteresting To Compensate For The Instruction It Might Afford.

[imeachable Conduct Is] Misconduct By Public Men, Or, In Other Words, From The Abuse Or Violation Of Some Public Trust.

[in The Event Of War, Americans Would] Resort For Repose And Security To Institutions Which Have A Tendency To Destroy Their Civil And Political Rights. To Be More Safe They, At Length, Become Willing To Run The Risk Of Being Less Free.

If The Constitution Is Adopted (and It Was) The Union Will Be In Fact And In Theory An Association Of States Or A Confederacy.

Wherever Indeed A Right Of Property Is Infringed For The General Good, If The Nature Of The Case Admits Of Compensation, It Ought To Be Made; But If Compensation Be Impracticable, That Impracticability Ought To Be An Obstacle To A Clearly Essential Reform.

To Model Our Political System Upon Speculations Of Lasting Tranquility, Is To Calculate On The Weaker Springs Of The Human Character.

It Is Far More Rational To Suppose That The Courts Were Designed To Be An Intermediate Body Between The People And The Legislature, In Order, Among Other Things, To Keep The Latter Within The Limits Assigned To Their Authority.

The Representatives Of The People, In A Popular Assembly, Seem Sometimes To Fancy That They Are The People Themselves, And Betray Strong Symptoms Of Impatience And Disgust At The Least Sign Of Opposition From Any Other Quarter; As If The Exercise Of Its Rights, By Either The Executive Or Judiciary, Were A Breach Of Their Privilege And An Outrage To Their Dignity.

If We Incline Too Much To Democracy, We Shall Soon Shoot Into A Monarchy.

No Character, However Upright, Is A Match For Constantly Reiterated Attacks, However False.

Human Condition

Laws Are A Dead Letter Without Courts To Expound And Define Their True Meaning And Operation.

The Standard Of Good Behavior For The Continuance In Office Of The Judicial Magistracy Is Certainly One Of The Most Valuable Of The Modern Improvements In The Practice Of Government.

There Can Be No Time, No State Of Things, In Which Credit Is Not Essential To A Nation.

A Share In The Sovereignty Of The State, Which Is Exercised By The Citizens At Large, In Voting At Elections Is One Of The Most Important Rights Of The Subject, And In A Republic Ought To Stand Foremost In The Estimation Of The Law...that Portion Of The Sovereignty, To Which Each Individual Is Entitled, Can Never Be Too Highly Prized. It Is That For Which We Have Fought And Bled.

If The Maintenance Of Public Credit, Then, Be Truly Important, The Next Enquiry Which Suggests Itself Is, By What Means It Is To Be Effected? The Ready Answer To Which Question Is, By Good Faith, By A Punctual Performance Of Contracts. States, Like Individuals, Who Observe Their Engagements, Are Respected And Trusted: While The Reverse Is The Fate Of Those Who Pursue An Opposite Conduct.

How Can You Trust People Who Are Poor And Own No Property? ... Inequality Of Property Will Exist As Long As Liberty Exists.

[v]igor Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty.

Remember Civil And Religious Liberty Always Go Together: If The Foundation Of The One Be Sapped, The Other Will Fall Of Course.

The History Of Human Conduct Does Not Warrant That Exalted Opinion Of Human Virtue Which Would Make It Wise In A Nation To Commit Interests Of So Delicate And Momentous A Kind As Those Which Concern Its Intercourse With The Rest Of The World, To The Sole Disposal Of A Magistrate, Created And Circumstanced, As Would Be A President Of The United States.

There Is A Contagion In Example Which Few Men Have Sufficient Force Of Mind To Resist.

It May Be Said That The Power Of Preventing Bad Laws Includes That Of Preventing Good Ones; And May Be Used To The One Purpose As Well As To The Other. But This Objection Will Have Little Weight With Those Who Can Properly Estimate The Mischiefs Of That Inconstancy And Mutability In The Laws, Which Form The Greatest Blemish In The Character And Genius Of Our Governments.

[a] Power Equal To Every Possible Contingency Must Exist Somewhere In The Government . . .

The Experience Of Past Ages May Inform Us, That When The Circumstances Of A People Render Them Distressed, Their Rulers Generally Recur To Severe, Cruel, And Oppressive Measures. Instead Of Endeavoring To Establish Their Authority In The Affection Of Their Subjects, They Think They Have No Security But In Their Fear.

Passive Commerce . . . Should Thus . . . [compel Us] To Content Ourselves With The First Price Of Our Commodities, And To See The Profits Of Our Trade Snatched From Us, To Enrich Our Enemies And Persecutors. That Unequalled Spirit Of Enterprise . . . An Inexhaustible Mine Of National Wealth, Would Be Stifled And Lost; And Poverty And Disgrace Would Overspread A Country, Which, With Wisdom, Might Make Herself The Admiration And Envy Of The World.

No Person That Has Enjoyed The Sweets Of Liberty Can Be Insensible Of Its Infinite Value, Or Can Reflect On Its Reverse Without Horror And Detestation

It Has Been Observed, [that For The Federal Government] To Coerce The States Is One Of The Maddest Projects That Was Ever Devised.

There Is At This Present Juncture, A Certain Fermentation Of Mind, A Certain Activity Of Speculation And Enterprise Which If Properly Directed May Be Made Subservient To Useful Purposes; But Which If Left Entirely To Itself, May Be Attended With Pernicious Effects.

The Vigour Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty. . . . A Dangerous Ambition More Often Lurks Behind The Specious Mask Of Zeal For The Rights Of The People, Than Under The Forbidding Appearance Of Zeal For The Firmness And Efficiency Of Government.

That There May Happen Cases In Which The National Government May Be Necessitated To Resort To Force, Cannot Be Denied.

Has It Been Found That Bodies Of Men Act With More Rectitude Or Greater Disinterestedness Than Individuals? The Contrary Of This Has Been Inferred By All Accurate Observers Of The Conduct Of Mankind; And The Inference Is Founded Upon Obvious Reasons. Regard To Reputation Has A Less Active Influence, When The Infamy Of A Bad Action Is To Be Divided Among A Number Than When It Is To Fall Singly Upon One.

We Must Make The Best Of Those Ills Which Cannot Be Avoided.

I Have A Tender Reliance On The Mercy Of The Almighty, Through The Merits Of The Lord Jesus Christ. I Am A Sinner. I Look To Him For Mercy; Pray For Me.

And It Is Long Since I Have Learned To Hold Popular Opinion Of No Value.

To All General Purposes We Have Uniformly Been One People Each Individual Citizen Everywhere Enjoying The Same National Rights, Privileges, And Protection.

It Is Of The Nature Of War To Increase The Executive At The Expense Of The Legislative Authority.

A Fondness For Power Is Implanted In Most Men, And It Is Natural To Abuse It When Acquired.

This Position Will Not Be Disputed So Long As It Is Admitted That The Desire Of Reward Is One Of The Strongest Incentives Of Human Conduct, Or That The Best Security For The Fidelity Of Mankind Is To Make Their Interest Coincide With Their Duty. Even The Love Of Fame, The Ruling Passion Of The Noblest Minds... Would On The Contrary Deter Him From The Undertaking, When He Foresaw That He Must Quit The Scene Before He Could Accomplish The Work.

Happy Will It Be For Ourselves, And Most Honorable For Human Nature, If We Have Wisdom And Virtue Enough To Set So Glorious An Example To Mankind!

Such A Wife As I Want... Must Be Young, Handsome I Lay Most Stress Upon A Good Shape, Sensible A Little Learning Will Do, Well-bread, Chaste, And Tender. As To Religion, A Moderate Stock Will Satisfy Me. She Must Believe In God And Hate A Saint.

An Over-scrupulous Jealousy Of Danger To The Rights Of The People, Which Is More Commonly The Fault Of The Head Than Of The Heart, Will Be Represented As Mere Pretense And Artifice, The Stale Bait For Popularity At The Expense Of The Public Good.

When You Assemble From Your Several Counties In The Legislature, Were Every Member To Be Guided Only By The Apparent Interest Of His County, Government Would Be Impracticable. There Must Be A Perpetual Accomodation And Sacrifice Of Local Advantage To General Expediency.

The Proposed Constitution, So Far From Implying An Abolition Of The State Governments, Makes Them Constituent Parts Of The National Sovereignty, By Allowing Them A Direct Representation In The Senate, And Leaves In Their Possession Certain Exclusive And Very Important Portions Of Sovereign Power. This Fully Corresponds, In Every Rational Import Of The Terms, With The Idea Of A Federal Government.

Would They Not Fear That Citizens Not Less Tenacious Than Conscious Of Their Rights Would Flock From The Remotest Extremes Of Their Respective States To The Places Of Election, To Overthrow Their Tyrants, And To Substitute Men Who Would Be Disposed To Avenge The Violated Majesty Of The People?

The Truth Is That The General Genius Of A Government Is All That Can Be Substantially Relied Upon For Permanent Effects. Particular Provisions, Though Not Altogether Useless, Have Far Less Virtue And Efficacy Than Are Commonly Ascribed To Them; And The Want Of Them Will Never Be With Men Of Sound Discernment A Decisive Objection To Any Plan Which Exhibits The Leading Characters Of A Good Government.

The Propriety Of A Law, In A Constitutional Light, Must Always Be Determined By The Nature Of The Powers Upon Which It Is Founded.

I Will Venture To Assert That No Combination Of Designing Men Under Heaven Will Be Capable Of Making A Government Unpopular Which Is In Its Principles A Wise And Good One, And Vigorous In Its Operations.

[if You Understood The Natural Rights Of Mankind,] [y]ou Would Be Convinced That Natural Liberty Is A Gift Of The Beneficent Creator To The Whole Human Race, And That Civil Liberty Is Founded In That, And Cannot Be Wrested From Any People Without The Most Manifest Violation Of Justice.

There Are Still To Be Found Visionary Or Designing Men, Who Stand Ready To Advocate The Paradox Of Perpetual Peace Between The States, Though Dismembered And Alienated From Each Other.... The Genius Of Republics, Say They, Is Pacific; The Spirit Of Commerce Has A Tendency To Soften The Manners Of Men, And To Extinguish Those Inflammable Humours Which Have So Often Kindled Into Wars. Commercial Republics, Like Ours, Will Never Be Disposed To Waste Themselves In Ruinous Contentions With Each Other. They Will Be Governed By Mutual Interest, And Will Cultivate A Spirit Of Mutual Amity And Concord.

Mutual Interest

[h]owever Weak Our Country May Be, I Hope We Shall Never Sacrifice Our Liberties.

Law Is Defined To Be A Rule Of Action; But How Can That Be A Rule, Which Is Little Known And Less Fixed?

The Genius Of The People Will Ill Brook The Inquisitive And Peremptory Spirit Of Excise Laws.

A Sacred Respect For The Constitutional Law Is The Vital Principle, The Sustaining Energy Of A Free Government.

As Riches Increase And Accumulate In Few Hands, As Luxury Prevails In Society, Virtue Will Be In A Greater Degree Considered As Only A Graceful Appendage Of Wealth, And The Tendency Of Things Will Be To Depart From The Republican Standard. This Is The Real Disposition Of Human Nature; It Is What Neither The Honorable Member Nor Myself Can Correct. It Is A Common Misfortunate That Awaits Our State Constitution, As Well As All Others.

By A Steady Adherence To The Union We May Hope, Erelong, To Become The Arbiter Of Europe In America, And To Be Able To Incline The Balance Of European Competitions In This Part Of The World As Our Interest May Dictate.

By Multiplying The Means Of Gratification, By Promoting The Introduction And Circulation Of The Precious Metals, Those Darling Objects Of Human Avarice And Enterprise, It Serves To Vivify And Invigorate The Channels Of Industry, And To Make Them Flow With Greater Activity And Copiousness. The Assiduous Merchant, The Laborious Husbandman, The Active Mechanic, And The Industrious Manufacturer,-all Orders Of Men, Look Forward With Eager Expectation And Growing Alacrity To This Pleasing Reward Of Their Toils.

The Same State Of The Passions Which Fits The Multitude, Who Have Not A Sufficient Stock Of Reason And Knowledge To Guide Them, For Opposition To Tyranny And Oppression, Very Naturally Leads Them To A Contempt And Disregard Of All Authority.

You Should Not Have Taken Advantage Of My Sensibility To Steal Into My Affections Without My Consent.

To Cherish And Stimulate The Activity Of The Human Mind, By Multiplying The Objects Of Enterprise, Is Not Among The Least Considerable Of The Expedients, By Which The Wealth Of A Nation May Be Promoted.

The Militia Is A Voluntary Force Not Associated Or Under The Control Of The States Except When Called Out; [ When Called Into Actual Service] A Permanent Or Long Standing Force Would Be Entirely Different In Make-up And Call.

Even To Observe Neutrality You Must Have A Strong Government.

Of Those Men Who Have Overturned The Liberties Of Republics, The Greatest Number Have Begun Their Career By Paying An Obsequious Court To The People, Commencing Demagogues And Ending Tyrants.

When Occasions Present Themselves, In Which The Interests Of The People Are At Variance With Their Inclinations, It Is The Duty Of The Persons Whom They Have Appointed To Be The Guardians Of Those Interests, To Withstand The Temporary Delusion, In Order To Give Them Time And Opportunity For More Cool And Sedate Reflection.

That Instability Is Inherent In The Nature Of Popular Governments, I Think Very Disputable … A Representative Democracy, Where The Right Of Election Is Well Secured And Regulated & The Exercise Of The Legislature, Executive, And Judiciary Authorities, Is Vested In Select Persons, Chosen Really And Not Nominally By The People, Will In My Opinion Be Most Likely To Be Happy, Regular And Durable.

The Local Interest Of A State Ought In Every Case To Give Way To The Interests Of The Union. For When A Sacrifice Of One Or The Other Is Necessary, The Former Becomes Only An Apparent, Partial Interest, And Should Yield, On The Principle That The Smaller Good Ought Never To Oppose The Greater Good.

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