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If, Then, The Courts Of Justice Are To Be Considered As The Bulwarks Of A Limited Constitution Against Legislative Encroachments, This Consideration Will Afford A Strong Argument For The Permanent Tenure Of Judicial Offices, Since Nothing Will Contribute So Much As This To That Independent Spirit In The Judges Which Must Be Essential To The Faithful Performance Of So Arduous A Duty.

-Alexander Hamilton

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If, Then, The Courts

Alexander Hamilton

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If, Then, The Courts Of Justice Are To Be Considered As The Bulwarks Of A Limited Constitution Against Legislative Encroachments, This Consideration Will Afford A Strong Argument For The Permanent Tenure Of Judicial Offices, Since Nothing Will Contribute So Much As This To That Independent Spirit In The Judges Which Must Be Essential To The Faithful Performance Of So Arduous A Duty.

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It Has Been Frequently Remarked, That It Seems To Have Been Reserved To The People Of This Country To Decide, By Their Conduct And Example, The Important Question, Whether Societies Of Men Are Really Capable Or Not, Of Establishing Good Government From Reflection And Choice, Or Whether They Are Forever Destined To Depend, For Their Political Constitutions, On Accident And Force.

The Militia Is A Voluntary Force Not Associated Or Under The Control Of The States Except When Called Out; [ When Called Into Actual Service] A Permanent Or Long Standing Force Would Be Entirely Different In Make-up And Call.

The States Have Authority To Interpret The Constitution, Enforce It, And Protect The People From Violations Of It By The Federal Government In The First Place, There Is Not A Syllable In The Plan Under Consideration Which Directly Empowers The National Courts To Construe The Laws According To The Spirit Of The Constitution, Or Which Gives Them Any Greater Latitude In This Respect Than May Be Claimed By The Courts Of Every State.

But The Greatest Obstacle Of All To The Successful Prosecution Of A New Branch Of Industry In A Country, In Which It Was Before Unknown, Consists . . . In The Bounties, Premiums, And Other Aids Which Are Granted, In A Variety Of Cases, By The Nations, In Which The Establishments To Be Imitated Are Previously Introduced.

One Great Error Is That We Suppose Mankind More Honest Than They Are.

The Same State Of The Passions Which Fits The Multitude, Who Have Not A Sufficient Stock Of Reason And Knowledge To Guide Them, For Opposition To Tyranny And Oppression, Very Naturally Leads Them To A Contempt And Disregard Of All Authority.

Perhaps Myself The First, At Some Expense Of Popularity, To Unfold The True Character Of Jefferson, It Is Too Late For Me To Become His Apologist. Nor Can I Have Any Disposition To Do It. I Admit That His Politics Are Tinctured With Fanaticism, That He Is Too Much In Earnest In His Democracy, That He Has Been A Mischievous Enemy To The Principle Measures Of Our Past Administration, That He Is Crafty & Persevering In His Objects, That He Is Not Scrupulous About The Means Of Success, Nor Very Mindful Of Truth, And That He Is A Contemptible Hypocrite.

Why Has Government Been Instituted At All? Because The Passions Of Man Will Not Conform To The Dictates Of Reason And Justice Without Constraint.

There Is No Part Of The Administration Of Government That Requires Extensive Information And A Thorough Knowledge Of The Principles Of Political Economy, So Much As The Business Of Taxation. The Man Who Understands Those Principles Best Will Be Least Likely To Resort To Oppressive Expedients, Or Sacrifice Any Particular Class Of Citizens To The Procurement Of Revenue. It Might Be Demonstrated That The Most Productive System Of Finance Will Always Be The Least Burdensome.

Thorough Knowledge

As To Taxes, They Are Evidently Inseparable From Government. It Is Impossible Without Them To Pay The Debts Of The Nation, To Protect It From Foreign Danger, Or To Secure Individuals From Lawless Violence And Rapine.

Energy In The Executive Is A Leading Character In The Definition Of Good Government. It Is Essential To The Protection Of The Community Against Foreign Attacks; It Is Not Less Essential To The Steady Administration Of The Laws; To The Protection Of Property Against Those Irregular And High-handed Combinations Which Sometimes Interrupt The Ordinary Course Of Justice; To The Security Of Liberty Against The Enterprises And Assaults Of Ambition, Of Faction, And Of Anarchy.

In The Usual Progress Of Things, The Necessities Of A Nation In Every Stage Of Its Existence Will Be Found At Least Equal To Its Resources.

How Can You Trust People Who Are Poor And Own No Property? ... Inequality Of Property Will Exist As Long As Liberty Exists.

The Variety Of More Minute Interests, Which Will Necessarily Fall Under The Superintendence Of The Local Administrations . . . Cannot Be Particularized Without Involving A Detail Too Tedious And Uninteresting To Compensate For The Instruction It Might Afford.

To Judge From The History Of Mankind, We Shall Be Compelled To Conclude, That The Fiery And Destructive Passions Of War, Reign In The Human Breast, With Much More Powerful Sway, Than The Mild And Beneficent Sentiments Of Peace.

If It Be Said That The Legislative Body Are Themselves The Constitutional Judges Of Their Own Powers, And That The Construction They Put Upon Them Is Conclusive Upon The Other Departments, It May Be Answered, That This Cannot Be The Natural Presumption, Where It Is Not Be Collected From Any Particular Provisions In The Constitution.

The Multitude . . . Have Not A Sufficient Stock Of Reason And Knowledge To Guide Them. . . . It Is Not Safe To Trust To The Virtue Of Any People.

War, Like Most Other Things, Is A Science To Be Acquired And Perfected By Diligence, By Perserverance, By Time, And By Practice.

We Must Make The Best Of Those Ills Which Cannot Be Avoided.

... For It Is A Truth, Which The Experience Of All Ages Has Attested, That The People Are Commonly Most In Danger When The Means Of Insuring Their Rights Are In The Possession Of Those Of Whom They Entertain The Least Suspicion.

There Are Respectable Individuals, Who From A Just Aversion To An Accumulation Of Public Debt, Are Unwilling To Concede To It Any Kind Of Utility, Who Can Discern No Good To Alleviate The Ill With Which They Suppose It Pregnant; Who Cannot Be Persuaded That It Ought In Any Sense To Be Viewed As An Increase Of Capital Lest It Should Be Inferred, That The More Debt The More Capital, The Greater The Burthens The Greater The Blessings Of The Community.

The Obscurity Is Much Oftener In The Passions And Prejudices Of The Reasoner Than In The Subject.

The Prosecution [of Impeachments], Will Seldom Fail To Agitate The Passions Of The Whole Community, And To Divide It Into Parties More Or Less Friendly Or Inimical To The Accused. The Subjects Of Its Jurisdiction Are Those Offenses Which Proceed From The Misconduct Of Public Men, Or, In Other Words, From The Abuse Or Violation Of Some Public Trust, And They Relate Chiefly To Injuries Done Immediately To The Society Itself.

A National Debt If It Is Not Excessive Will Be To Us A National Blessing; It Will Be Powerfull Cement Of Our Union. It Will Also Create A Necessity For Keeping Up Taxation To A Degree Which Without Being Oppressive, Will Be A Spur To Industry.

If The Constitution Is Adopted (and It Was) The Union Will Be In Fact And In Theory An Association Of States Or A Confederacy.

[i]n Framing A Government For A Nation We Ought, In Those Provisions Which Are Designed To Be Permanent, To Calculate Not On Temporary, But On Permanent Causes Of Expence.

The Injury Which May Possibly Be Done By Defeating A Few Good Laws, Will Be Amply Compensated By The Advantage Of Preventing A Number Of Bad Ones.

Man Is Either Governed By His Own Laws - Freedom - Or The Laws Of Another - Slavery. Are You Willing To Become Slaves? Will You Give Up Your Freedom, Your Life And Your Property Without A Single Struggle? No Man Has A Right To Rule Over His Fellow Creatures.

To Look For A Continuation In Harmony Between A Number Of Independent Unconnected Sovereignties, Situated In The Same Neighborhood, Would Be To Disregard The Uniform Course Of Human Events, And To Set At Defiance The Accumulated Experience Of Ages.

Here, Sir, The People Govern; Here They Act By Their Immediate Representatives.

Representatives

There Is One Transcendant Advantage Belonging To The Province Of The State Governments . . . -i Mean The Ordinary Administration Of Criminal And Civil Justice.

Now, Mark My Words. So Long As We Are A Young And Virtuous People, This Instument Will Bind Us Together In Mutual Interests, Mutual Welfare, And Mutual Happiness. But When We Become Old And Corrupt, It Will Bind No Longer.

Mutual Interest

Common Interest May Always Be Reckoned Upon As The Surest Bond Of Sympathy.

I Confess I Am At A Loss To Discover What Temptation The Persons Entrusted With The Administration Of The General Government Could Ever Feel To Divest The States Of The Authorities Of That Description. The Regulation Of The Mere Domestic Police Of A State Appears To Me To Hold Out Slender Allurements To Ambition.

The Only Distinction Between Freedom And Slavery Consists In This: In The Former State A Man Is Governed By The Laws To Which He Has Given His Consent, Either In Person Or By His Representative; In The Latter, He Is Governed By The Will Of Another. In The One Case, His Life And Property Are His Own; In The Other, They Depend Upon The Pleasure Of His Master. It Is Easy To Discern Which Of These Two States Is Preferable.

As To Religion A Moderate Stock Will Satisfy Me. She Must Believe In God And Hate A Saint.

Take Mankind In General, They Are Vicious-their Passions May Be Operated Upon.

The Increasing Remoteness Of Consanguinity Is Everyday Diminishing The Force Of The Family Compact Between France And Spain. And Politicians Have Ever With Great Reason Considered The Ties Of Blood As Feeble And Precarious Links Of Political Connection.

To Attempt To Enumerate The Complicated Variety Of Mischiefs In The Whole System Of The Social Economy, Which Proceed From A Neglect Of The Maxims That Uphold Public Credit, And Justify The Solicitude Manifested By The House On This Point, Would Be An Improper Intrusion On Their Time And Patience.

Experience Teaches, That Men Are Often So Much Governed By What They Are Accustomed To See And Practice, That The Simplest And Most Obvious Improvements . . . Are Adopted With Hesitation, Reluctance, And Slow Gradations.

While The Constitution Continues To Be Read, And Its Principles Known, The States, Must, By Every Rational Man, Be Considered As Essential Component Parts Of The Union; And Therefore The Idea Of Sacrificing The Former To The Latter Is Totally Inadmissible.

But Though A Funded Debt Is Not In The First Instance, An Absolute Increase Of Capital, Or An Augmentation Of Real Wealth; Yet By Serving As A New Power In The Operation Of Industry, It Has Within Certain Bounds A Tendency To Increase The Real Wealth Of A Community, In Like Manner As Money Borrowed By A Thrifty Farmer, To Be Laid Out In The Improvement Of His Farm May, In The End, Add To His Stock Of Real Riches.

The Legislatures Will Have Better Means Of Information. They Can Discover The Danger At A Distance; And Possessing All The Organs Of Civil Power, And The Confidence Of The People, They Can At Once Adopt A Regular Plan Of Opposition, In Which They Can Combine All The Resources Of The Community. They Can Readily Communicate With Each Other In The Different States, And Unite Their Common Forces For The Protection Of Their Common Liberty.

A Nation Which Can Prefer Disgrace To Danger Is Prepared For A Master, And Deserves One.

American Revolution

And As The Vicissitudes Of Nations Beget A Perpetual Tendency To The Accumulation Of Debt, There Ought To Be In Every Government A Perpetual, Anxious, And Unceasing Effort To Reduce That, Which At Any Times Exists, As Fast As Shall Be Practicable Consistently With Integrity And Good Faith.

Safety From External Danger Is The Most Powerful Director Of National Conduct. Even The Ardent Love Of Liberty Will, After A Time, Give Way To Its Dictates. The Violent Destruction Of Life And Property Incident To War, The Continual Effort And Alarm Attendant On A State Of Continual Danger, Will Compel Nations The Most Attached To Liberty To Resort For Repose And Security To Institutions Which Have A Tendency To Destroy Their Civil And Political Rights. To Be More Safe, They At Length Become Willing To Run The Risk Of Being Less Free.

The Proposed Constitution, So Far From Implying An Abolition Of The State Governments, Makes Them Constituent Parts Of The National Sovereignty, By Allowing Them A Direct Representation In The Senate, And Leaves In Their Possession Certain Exclusive And Very Important Portions Of Sovereign Power. This Fully Corresponds, In Every Rational Import Of The Terms, With The Idea Of A Federal Government.

[imeachable Conduct Is] Misconduct By Public Men, Or, In Other Words, From The Abuse Or Violation Of Some Public Trust.

The Honor Of A Nation Is Its Life. Deliberately To Abandon It Is To Commit An Act Of Political Suicide.

It's Not Tyranny We Desire; It's A Just, Limited, Federal Government.

[t]hough Individual Oppression May Now And Then Proceed Fro The Courts Of Justice, The General Liberty Of The People Can Never Be Endangered From That Quarter . . .

To Cherish And Stimulate The Activity Of The Human Mind, By Multiplying The Objects Of Enterprise, Is Not Among The Least Considerable Of The Expedients, By Which The Wealth Of A Nation May Be Promoted.

In A Free Government, The Security For Civil Rights Must Be The Same As That For Religious Rights. It Consists In The One Case In The Multiplicity Of Interests, And In The Other In The Multiplicity Of Sects.

A Government Ought To Contain In Itself Every Power Requisite To The Full Accomplishment Of The Objects Committed To Its Care, And To The Complete Execution Of The Trusts For Which It Is Responsible, Free From Every Other Control But A Regard To The Public Good And To The Sense Of The People.

The Inquiry Constantly Is What Will Please, Not What Will Benefit The People. In Such A Government There Can Be Nothing But Temporary Expedient, Fickleness, And Folly.

If The Exercise Of Power Of Internal Taxation By The Union Should Be Discovered On Experiment To Be Really Inconvenient, The Federal Government May Then Forbear The Use Of It . . .

The Idea Of Restraining The Legislative Authority, In The Means Of Providing For The National Defense, Is One Of Those Refinements Which Owe Their Origin To A Zeal For Liberty More Ardent Than Enlightened.

The Praise Of A Civilized World Is Justly Due To Christianity;—war, By The Influence Of The Humane Principles Of That Religion, Has Been Stripped Of Half Its Horrors. The French Renounce Christianity, And They Relapse Into Barbarism;—war Resumes The Same Hideous And Savage Form Which It Wore In The Ages Of Gothic And Roman Violence.

The Same Rule That Teaches The Propriety Of A Partition Between The Various Branches Of Power, Teaches Us Likewise That This Partition Ought To Be So Contrived As To Render The One Independent Of The Other.

That Americans Are Entitled To Freedom Is Incontestable On Every Rational Principle. All Men Have One Common Original: They Participate In One Common Nature, And Consequently Have One Common Right. No Reason Can Be Assigned Why One Man Should Exercise Any Power Or Preeminence Over His Fellow-creatures More Than Another; Unless They Have Voluntarily Vested Him With It.

We Are Now Forming A Republican Government. Real Liberty Is Never Found In Despotism Or The Extremes Of Democracy, But In Moderate Governments.

Of All The Cares Or Concerns Of Government, The Direction Of War Most Peculiarly Demands Those Qualities Which Distinguish The Exercise Of Power By A Single Hand. The Direction Of War Implies The Direction Of The Common Strength; And The Power Of Directing And Employing The Common Strength, Forms A Usual And Essential Part In The Definition Of The Executive Authority.

Government Is Frequently And Aptly Classed Under Two Descriptions-a Government Of Force, And A Government Of Laws; The First Is The Definition Of Despotism-the Last, Of Liberty.

The Inhabitants Of Territories, Often The Theatre Of War, Are Unavoidably Subject To Frequent Infringements On Their Rights, Which Serve To Weaken Their Sense Of Those Rights; And By Degrees, The People Are Brought To Consider The Soldiery Not Only As Their Protectors But As Their Superiors.

There Are Some Who Maintain That Trade Will Regulate Itself, And It Is Not To Be Benefited By The Encouragements Or Restraints Of Government. Such Persons Will Imagine That There Is No Need Of A Common Directing Power. This Is One Of Those Wild Speculative Paradoxes, Which Have Grown Into Credit Among Us, Contrary To The Uniform Practice And Sense Of The Most Enlightened Nations.

The Laws Of Congress Are Restricted To A Certain Sphere, And When They Depart From This Sphere, They Are No Longer Supreme Or Binding.

As You Sometimes Swear By Him That Made You, I Conclude Your Sentiments Do Not Correspond With His, In That Which Is The Basis Of The Doctrine You Both Agree In: And This Makes It Impossible To Imagine Whence This Congruity Between You Arises. "to Grant That There Is A Supreme Intelligence Who Rules The World And Has Established Laws To Regulate The Actions Of His Creatures; And Still To Assert That Man, In A State Of Nature, May Be Considered As Perfectly Free From All Restraints Of Law And Government, Appears To A Common Understanding Altogether Irreconcilable.

The Passions Of A Revolution Are Apt To Hurry Even Good Men Into Excesses.

[w]e Must Extend The Authority Of The Union To The Persons Of The Citizens - The Only Proper Objects Of Government.

The Vigour Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty. . . . A Dangerous Ambition More Often Lurks Behind The Specious Mask Of Zeal For The Rights Of The People, Than Under The Forbidding Appearance Of Zeal For The Firmness And Efficiency Of Government.

In All Very Numerous Assemblies, Of Whatever Character Composed, Passion Never Fails To Wrest The Sceptre From Reason. Had Every Athenian Citizen Been A Socrates, Every Athenian Assembly Would Still Have Been A Mob.

A Law, By The Very Meaning Of The Term, Includes Supremacy. It Is A Rule Which Those To Whom It Is Prescribed Are Bound To Observe. This Results From Every Political Association.

The Liberty Of The Press Consists In The Right To Publish With Impunity Truth With Good Motives For Justifiable Ends, Though Reflecting On Government, Magistracy, Or Individuals.

It May Be Laid Down As A General Rule, That Their Confidence In And Obedience To A Government, Will Be Commonly Proportioned To The Goodness Or Badness Of Its Administration . . . . Various Reasons Have Been Suggested In The Course Of These Papers, To Induce A Probability That The General Government Will Be Better Administered Than The Particular Governments.

Little More Can Reasonably Be Aimed At With Respect To The People At Large Than To Have Them Properly Armed.

Second Amendment

If The End Be Clearly Comprehended Within Any Of The Specified Powers, And If The Measure Have An Obvious Relation To That End, And Is Not Forbidden By Any Particular Provision Of The Constitution, It May Safely Be Deemed To Come Within The Compass Of The National Authority.

These Are Not Vague Inferences . . . But They Are Solid Conclusions Drawn From The Natural And Necessary Progress Of Human Affairs.

It Is An Unquestionable Truth, That The Body Of The People In Every Country Desire Sincerely Its Prosperity. But It Is Equally Unquestionable That They Do Not Possess The Discernment And Stability Necessary For Systematic Government. To Deny That They Are Frequently Led Into The Grossest Of Errors, By Misinformation And Passion, Would Be A Flattery Which Their Own Good Sense Must Despise.

That Instability Is Inherent In The Nature Of Popular Governments, I Think Very Disputable … A Representative Democracy, Where The Right Of Election Is Well Secured And Regulated & The Exercise Of The Legislature, Executive, And Judiciary Authorities, Is Vested In Select Persons, Chosen Really And Not Nominally By The People, Will In My Opinion Be Most Likely To Be Happy, Regular And Durable.

It Equally Proves, That Though Individual Oppression May Now And Then Proceed From The Courts Of Justice, The General Liberty Of The People Can Never Be Endangered From That Quarter; I Mean So Long As The Judiciary Remains Truly Distinct From Both The Legislature And The Executive. For I Agree, That "there Is No Liberty, If The Power Of Judging Be Not Separated From The Legislative And Executive Powers." And It Proves, In The Last Place, That As Liberty Can Have Nothing To Fear From The Judiciary Alone, But Would Have Every Thing To Fear From Its Union With Either Of The Other Departments.

Tyranny Has Perhaps Oftener Grown Out Of The Assumptions Of Power, Called For, On Pressing Exigencies, By A Defective Constitution, Than Out Of The Full Exercise Of The Largest Constitutional Authorities.

It Will Follow That That Government Ought To Be Clothed With All Powers Requisite To Complete Execution Of Its Trust.

I Have Thought It My Duty To Exhibit Things As They Are, Not As They Ought To Be.

The Experience Of Treaties Being Broken With Impunity Provide An Afflicting Lesson To Mankind How Little Dependence Is To Be Placed On Treaties Which Have No Other Sanction Than The Obligations Of Good Faith; And Which Oppose General Considerations Of Peace And Justice To The Impulse Of Any Immediate Interest And Passion.

It Was Remarked Yesterday That A Numerous Representation Was Necessary To Obtain The Confidence Of The People. This Is Not Generally True. The Confidence Of The People Will Easily Be Gained By A Good Administration. This Is The True Touchstone.

When The Sword Is Once Drawn, The Passions Of Men Observe No Bounds Of Moderation.

This Power Ought To Be Coextensive With All The Possible Combinations Of Such Circumstances; And Ought To Be Under The Direction Of The Same Councils Which Are Appointed To Preside Over The Common Defense.

The [president] Has No Particle Of Spiritual Jurisdiction. . . .

Some Reasonable Term Ought To Be Allowed To Enable Aliens To Get Rid Of Foreign And Acquire American Attachments; To Learn The Principles And Imbibe The Spirit Of Our Government; And To Admit Of A Probability At Least, Of Their Feeling A Real Interest In Our Affairs.

In The Main It Will Be Found That A Power Over A Man's Support [salary] Is A Power Over His Will.

It Is The Advertiser Who Provides The Paper For The Subscriber. It Is Not To Be Disputed, That The Publisher Of A Newspaper In This Country, Without A Very Exhaustive Advertising Support, Would Receive Less Reward For His Labor Than The Humblest Mechanic.

I Will Venture To Assert That No Combination Of Designing Men Under Heaven Will Be Capable Of Making A Government Unpopular Which Is In Its Principles A Wise And Good One, And Vigorous In Its Operations.

I Go Further, And Affirm That Bills Of Rights, In The Sense And To The Extent In Which They Are Contended For, Are Not Only Unnecessary In The Proposed Constitution, But Would Even Be Dangerous. They Would Contain Various Exceptions To Powers Not Granted; And On This Very Account, Would Afford A Colorable Pretext To Claim More Than Were Granted. For Why Declare That Things Shall Not Be Done Which There Is No Power To Do?

To Presume A Want Of Motives For Such Contests . . . Would Be To Forget That Men Are Ambitious, Vindictive, And Rapacious.

No Man In His Senses Can Hesitate In Choosing To Be Free, Rather Than A Slave.

American Revolution

Constitutions Of Civil Government Are Not To Be Framed Upon A Calculation Of Existing Exigencies, But Upon A Combination Of These With The Probable Exigencies Of Ages, According To The Natural And Tried Course Of Human Affairs. Nothing, Therefore, Can Be More Fallacious Than To Infer The Extent Of Any Power, Proper To Be Lodged In The National Government, From An Estimate Of Its Immediate Necessities.

There Is No Position Which Depends On Clearer Principles Than That Every Act Of A Delegated Authority, Contrary To The Commission Under Which It Is Exercised, Is Void. No Legislative Act, Therefore, Contrary To The Constitution, Can Be Valid.

It Is Evident From The State Of The Country, From The Habits Of The People, From The Experience We Have Had On The Point Itself, That It Is Impracticable To Raise Any Very Considerable Sums By Direct Taxation.

What Plan For The Regulation Of The Militia May Be Pursued By The National Government Is Impossible To Be Foreseen...the Project Of Disciplining All The Militia Of The United States Is As Futile As It Would Be Injurious If It Were Capable Of Being Carried Into Execution... Little More Can Reasonably Be Aimed At With The Respect To The People At Large Than To Have Them Properly Armed And Equipped ; And In Order To See That This Be Not Neglected, It Will Be Necessary To Assemble Them Once Or Twice In The Course Of A Year.

The Rights Of Neutrality Will Only Be Respected When They Are Defended By An Adequate Power. A Nation, Despicable By Its Weakness, Forfeits Even The Privilege Of Being Neutral.

The Law... Dictated By God Himself Is, Of Course, Superior In Obligation To Any Other. It Is Binding Over All The Globe, In All Countries, And At All Times. No Human Laws Are Of Any Validity If Contrary To This.

It Is Impossible Not To Bestow The Imputation Of Deliberate Imposture And Deception Upon The Gross Pretense Of A Similitude Between A King Of Great Britain And A Magistrate Of The Character Marked Out For That Of The President Of The United States. It Is Still More Impossible To Withhold That Imputation From The Rash And Barefaced Expedients Which Have Been Employed To Give Success To The Attempted Imposition.

Nothing Can Be More Evident, Than That An Exclusive Power Of Regulating Elections For The National Government, In The Hands Of The State Legislatures, Would Leave The Existence Of The Union Entirely At Their Mercy . . . . It Is To Little Purpose To Say That A Neglect Or Omission Of This Kind [not Letting The Feds Have Elections], Would Be Unlikely To Take Place. The Constitutional Possibility Of The Thing, Without An Equivalent For The Risk, Is An Unanswerable Objection.

It Is Far More Rational To Suppose That The Courts Were Designed To Be An Intermediate Body Between The People And The Legislature, In Order, Among Other Things, To Keep The Latter Within The Limits Assigned To Their Authority.

To Watch The Progress Of Such Endeavors Is The Office Of A Free Press. To Give Us Early Alarm And Put Us On Our Guard Against Encroachments Of Power. This Then Is A Right Of Utmost Importance, One For Which, Instead Of Yielding It Up, We Ought Rather To Spill Our Blood.

Passive Commerce . . . Should Thus . . . [compel Us] To Content Ourselves With The First Price Of Our Commodities, And To See The Profits Of Our Trade Snatched From Us, To Enrich Our Enemies And Persecutors. That Unequalled Spirit Of Enterprise . . . An Inexhaustible Mine Of National Wealth, Would Be Stifled And Lost; And Poverty And Disgrace Would Overspread A Country, Which, With Wisdom, Might Make Herself The Admiration And Envy Of The World.

Give Me The Steady, Uniform, Unshaken Security Of Constitutional Freedom. Give Me The Right To Be Tried By A Jury Of My Own Neighbors, And To Be Taxed By My Own Representatives Only. What Will Become Of The Law And Courts Of Justice Without This? The Shadow May Remain, But The Substance Will Be Gone. I Would Die To Preserve The Law Upon A Solid Foundation; But Take Away Liberty, And The Foundation Is Destroyed.

It Is Of The Nature Of War To Increase The Executive At The Expense Of The Legislative Authority.

As On The One Hand, The Necessity For Borrowing In Particular Emergencies Cannot Be Doubted, So On The Other, It Is Equally Evident That To Be Able To Borrow Upon Good Terms, It Is Essential That The Credit Of A Nation Should Be Well Established.

The Prosperity Of Commerce Is Now Perceived And Acknowledged By All Enlightened Statesmen To Be The Most Useful As Well As The Most Productive Source Of National Wealth, And Has Accordingly Become A Primary Object Of Their Political Cares.

The Best We Can Hope For Concerning The People At Large Is That They Be Properly Armed.

When You Assemble From Your Several Counties In The Legislature, Were Every Member To Be Guided Only By The Apparent Interest Of His County, Government Would Be Impracticable. There Must Be A Perpetual Accomodation And Sacrifice Of Local Advantage To General Expediency.

And It Is Long Since I Have Learned To Hold Popular Opinion Of No Value.

The Desire Of Reward Is One Of The Strongest Incentives Of Human Conduct; ... The Best Security For The Fidelity Of Mankind Is To Make Their Interest Coincide With Their Duty.

A Fondness For Power Is Implanted In Most Men, And It Is Natural To Abuse It When Acquired. This Maxim, Drawn From The Experience Of All Ages, Makes It The Height Of Folly To Intrust Any Set Of Men With Power Which Is Not Under Every Possible Control; Perpetual Strides Are Made After More As Long As There Is Any Part Withheld.

Such A Wife As I Want... Must Be Young, Handsome I Lay Most Stress Upon A Good Shape, Sensible A Little Learning Will Do, Well-bread, Chaste, And Tender. As To Religion, A Moderate Stock Will Satisfy Me. She Must Believe In God And Hate A Saint.

The Origin Of All Civil Government, Justly Established, Must Be A Voluntary Compact, Between The Rulers And The Ruled; And Must Be Liable To Such Limitations, As Are Necessary For The Security Of The Absolute Rights Of The Latter; For What Original Title Can Any Man Or Set Of Men Have, To Govern Others, Except Their Own Consent?

Self-preservation Is The First Principle Of Our Nature.

The Institution Of Delegated Power Implies That There Is A Portion Of Virtue And Honor Among Mankind Which May Be A Reasonable Foundation Of Confidence.

It Is A General Principle Of Human Nature, That A Man Will Be Interested In Whatever He Possesses, In Proportion To The Firmness Or Precariousness Of The Tenure By Which He Holds It.

And It Proves, In The Last Place, That Liberty Can Have Nothing To Fear From The Judiciary Alone, But Would Have Everything To Fear From Its Union With Either Of The Other Departments.

Executive Power

To Model Our Political System Upon Speculations Of Lasting Tranquility, Is To Calculate On The Weaker Springs Of The Human Character.

The Truth Is That The General Genius Of A Government Is All That Can Be Substantially Relied Upon For Permanent Effects. Particular Provisions, Though Not Altogether Useless, Have Far Less Virtue And Efficacy Than Are Commonly Ascribed To Them; And The Want Of Them Will Never Be With Men Of Sound Discernment A Decisive Objection To Any Plan Which Exhibits The Leading Characters Of A Good Government.

These Powers Ought To Exist Without Limitation, Because It Is Impossible To Foresee Or To Define The Extent And Variety Of National Exigencies, And The Correspondent Extent And Variety Of The Means Which May Be Necessary To Satisfy Them.

There Is At This Present Juncture, A Certain Fermentation Of Mind, A Certain Activity Of Speculation And Enterprise Which If Properly Directed May Be Made Subservient To Useful Purposes; But Which If Left Entirely To Itself, May Be Attended With Pernicious Effects.

The People Are Turbulent And Changing; They Seldom Judge Right Or Make Good Decision.

The Spirit Of Enterprise, Which Characterizes The Commercial Part Of America, Has Left No Occasion Of Displaying Itself Unimproved. It Is Not At All Probable That This Unbridled Spirit Would Pay Much Respect To Those Regulations Of Trade By Which Particular States Might Endeavor To Secure Exclusive Benefits To Their Own Citizens.

I Expect We Shall Be Told, That The Militia Of The Country Is Its Natural Bulwark, And Would Be At All Times Equal To The National Defence...the Facts, Which From Our Own Experience Forbid A Reliance Of This Kind, Are Too Recent To Permit Us To Be The Dupes Of Such A Suggestion.

Remember Civil And Religious Liberty Always Go Together: If The Foundation Of The One Be Sapped, The Other Will Fall Of Course.

It Is A General Principle Of Human Nature, That A Man Will Be Interested In Whatever He Possesses, In Proportion To The Firmness Or Precariousness Of The Tenure By Which He Holds It; Will Be Less Attached To What He Holds By A Momentary Or Uncertain Title, Than To What He Enjoys By A Durable Or Certain Title; And, Of Course, Will Be Willing To Risk More For The Sake Of The One, Than For The Sake Of The Other.

The Sacred Rights Of Mankind Are Not To Be Rummaged For Among Old Parchments Or Musty Records. They Are Written, As With A Sunbeam, In The Whole Volume Of Human Nature, By The Hand Of The Divinity Itself; And Can Never Be Erased.

That Experience Is The Parent Of Wisdom Is An Adage The Truth Of Which Is Recognized By The Wisest As Well As The Simplest Of Mankind.

Whoever Attentively Considers The Different Departments Of Power Must Perceive, That, In A Government In Which They Are Separated From Each Other, The Judiciary, From The Nature Of Its Functions, Will Always Be The Least Dangerous To The Political Rights Of The Constitution; Because It Will Be Least In A Capacity To Annoy Or Injure Them.

Every Power Vested In A Government Is In Its Nature Sovereign, And Includes By Force Of The Term A Right To Employ All The Means Requisite . . . To The Attainment Of The Ends Of Such Power.

Laws Are A Dead Letter Without Courts To Expound And Define Their True Meaning And Operation.

Foreign Influence Is Truly The Grecian Horse To A Republic. We Cannot Be Too Careful To Exclude Its Influence.

A Sacred Respect For The Constitutional Law Is The Vital Principle, The Sustaining Energy Of A Free Government.

Establish That A Government May Decline A Provision For Its Debts, Though Able To Make It, And You Overthrow All Public Morality, You Unhinge All The Principles That Must Preserve The Limits Of Free Constitutions.

If It Were To Be Asked, What Is The Most Sacred Duty And The Greatest Source Of Our Security In A Republic? The Answer Would Be, An Inviolable Respect For The Constitution And Laws - The First Growing Out Of The Last . . . . A Sacred Respect For The Constitutional Law Is The Vital Principle, The Sustaining Energy Of A Free Government.

The President Of The United States Would Be Liable To Be Impeached, Tried, And Upon Conviction Of Treason, Bribery, Or Other High Crimes And Misdemeanors, Removed From Office; And Would Afterwards Be Liable To Prosecution And Punishment In The Ordinary Course Of Law. The Person Of The King Of Great Britain Is Sacred And Inviolable: There Is No Constitutional Tribunal To Which He Is Amenable, No Punishment To Which He Can Be Subjected Without Involving The Crisis Of A National Revolution.

Its Objects Are Contracts With Foreign Nations Which Have The Force Of Law, But Derive It From The Obligations Of Good Faith.

A Share In The Sovereignty Of The State, Which Is Exercised By The Citizens At Large, In Voting At Elections Is One Of The Most Important Rights Of The Subject, And In A Republic Ought To Stand Foremost In The Estimation Of The Law...that Portion Of The Sovereignty, To Which Each Individual Is Entitled, Can Never Be Too Highly Prized. It Is That For Which We Have Fought And Bled.

[t]here Is Not A Syllable In The Plan Under Consideration Which Directly Empowers The National Courts To Construe The Laws According To The Spirit Of The Constitution.

There Is Something So Far-fetched And So Extravagant In The Idea Of Danger To Liberty From The Militia That One Is At A Loss Whether To Treat It With Gravity Or With Raillery; Whether To Consider It As A Mere Trial Of Skill, Like The Paradoxes Of Rhetoricians; As A Disingenuous Artifice To Instil Prejudices At Any Price; Or As The Serious.

There Is A Contagion In Example Which Few Men Have Sufficient Force Of Mind To Resist.

The Experience Of Past Ages May Inform Us, That When The Circumstances Of A People Render Them Distressed, Their Rulers Generally Recur To Severe, Cruel, And Oppressive Measures. Instead Of Endeavoring To Establish Their Authority In The Affection Of Their Subjects, They Think They Have No Security But In Their Fear.

The President, And Government, Will Only Control The Militia When A Part Of Them Is In The Actual Service Of The Federal Government, Else, They Are Independent And Not Under The Command Of The President Or The Government. The States Would Control The Militia, Only When Called Out Into The Service Of The State, And Then The Governor Would Be Commander In Chief Where Enumerated In The Respective State Constitution.

Men Give Me Credit For Some Genius. All The Genius I Have Lies In This; When I Have A Subject In Hand, I Study It Profoundly. Day And Night It Is Before Me. My Mind Becomes Pervaded With It. Then The Effort That I Have Made Is What People Are Pleased To Call The Fruit Of Genius. It Is The Fruit Of Labor And Thought.

The System Is The Best That The Present Views And Circumstances Of The Country Will Permit.

When A Government Betrays The People By Amassing Too Much Power And Becoming Tyrannical, The People Have No Choice But To Exercise Their Original Right Of Self-defense — To Fight The Government.

Let Us Recollect That Peace Or War Will Not Always Be Left To Our Option; That However Moderate Or Unambitious We May Be, We Cannot Count Upon The Moderation, Or Hope To Extinguish The Ambition Of Others.

Money Is, With Propriety, Considered As The Vital Principle Of The Body Politic; As That Which Sustains Its Life And Motion, And Enables It To Perform Its Most Essential Functions.

Here Sir, The People Govern.

Representatives

In This Distribution Of Powers The Wisdom Of Our Constitution Is Manifested. It Is The Province And Duty Of The Executive To Preserve To The Nation The Blessings Of Peace. The Legislature Alone Can Interrupt Those Blessings, By Placing The Nation In A State Of War.

Distribution Of Power

The Deliberative Sense Of The Community Should Govern.

In A Government Framed For Durable Liberty, Not Less Regard Must Be Paid To Giving The Magistrate A Proper Degree Of Authority, To Make And Execute The Laws With Rigour, Than To Guarding Against Encroachments Upon The Rights Of The Community. As Too Much Power Leads To Despotism, Too Little Leads To Anarchy, And Both Eventually To The Ruin Of The People.

[v]igor Of Government Is Essential To The Security Of Liberty.

There Are Still To Be Found Visionary Or Designing Men, Who Stand Ready To Advocate The Paradox Of Perpetual Peace Between The States, Though Dismembered And Alienated From Each Other.... The Genius Of Republics, Say They, Is Pacific; The Spirit Of Commerce Has A Tendency To Soften The Manners Of Men, And To Extinguish Those Inflammable Humours Which Have So Often Kindled Into Wars. Commercial Republics, Like Ours, Will Never Be Disposed To Waste Themselves In Ruinous Contentions With Each Other. They Will Be Governed By Mutual Interest, And Will Cultivate A Spirit Of Mutual Amity And Concord.

Mutual Interest

The Courts Must Declare The Sense Of The Law; And If They Should Be Disposed To Exercise Will Instead Of Judgement; The Consequences Would Be The Substitution Of Their Pleasure For That Of The Legislative Body.

Man Is A Reasoning Rather Than A Reasonable Animal.

Were Not The Disadvantages Of Slavery Too Obvious To Stand In Need Of It, I Might Enumerate And Describe The Tedious Train Of Calamities Inseparable From It. I Might Show That It Is Fatal To Religion And Morality; That It Tends To Debase The Mind, And Corrupt Its Noblest Springs Of Action. I Might Show That It Relaxes The Sinews Of Industry, Clips The Wings Of Commerce, And Introduces Misery And Indigence In Every Shape.

The Constitution Of Human Nature" Teaches Us Not To Expect "that The Persons, Entrusted With The Administration Of The Affairs Of The Particular Members Of A Confederacy, Will At All Times Be Ready, With Perfect Good Humor, And An Unbiased Regard To The Public Weal, To Execute The Resolutions Of Decrees Of The General Authority." "this Tendency Is Not Difficult To Be Accounted For," Publius Argues, "it Has Its Origin In The Love Of Power.

The Local Interest Of A State Ought In Every Case To Give Way To The Interests Of The Union. For When A Sacrifice Of One Or The Other Is Necessary, The Former Becomes Only An Apparent, Partial Interest, And Should Yield, On The Principle That The Smaller Good Ought Never To Oppose The Greater Good.

The True Principle Of Government Is This - Make The System Compleat In Its Structure; Give A Perfect Proportion And Balance To Its Parts; And The Powers You Give It Will Never Affect Your Security.

This [a State Militia System] Appears To Me The Only Substitute That Can Be Devised For A Standing Army, And The Best Possible Security Against It, If It Should Exist.

Second Amendment

Right To Bear Arms

The Power Of Creating New Funds Upon New Objects Of Taxation, By Its Own Authority, Would Enable The National Government To Borrow As Far As Its Necessities Might Require.

[t]he Constitution Ought To Be The Standard Of Construction For The Laws, And That Wherever There Is An Evident Opposition, The Laws Ought To Give Place To The Constitution. But This Doctrine Is Not Deducible From Any Circumstance Peculiar To The Plan Of Convention, But From The General Theory Of A Limited Constitution.

The State Governments Possess Inherent Advantages, Which Will Ever Give Them An Influence And Ascendancy Over The National Government, And Will For Ever Preclude The Possibility Of Federal Encroachments. That Their Liberties, Indeed, Can Be Subverted By The Federal Head, Is Repugnant To Every Rule Of Political Calculation.

Constitutions Should Consist Only Of General Provisions; The Reason Is That They Must Necessarily Be Permanent, And That They Cannot Calculate For The Possible Change Of Things.

Constitution Of The United States

If Mankind Were To Resolve To Agree In No Institution Of Government, Until Every Part Of It Had Been Adjusted To The Most Exact Standard Of Perfection, Society Would Soon Become A General Scene Of Anarchy, And The World A Desert.

A Struggle For Liberty Is In Itself Respectable And Glorious. . . . When Conducted With Magnanimity, Justice And Humanity, It Ought To Command The Admiration Of Every Friend To Human Nature. But If Sullied By Crimes And Extravagancies, It Loses Its Respectability.

If The Federal Government Should Overpass The Just Bounds Of Its Authority And Make A Tyrannical Use Of Its Powers, The People, Whose Creature It Is, Must Appeal To The Standard They Have Formed, And Take Such Measures To Redress The Injury Done To The Constitution As The Exigency May Suggest And Prudence Justify.

The Laws Of Certain States . . . Give An Ownership In The Service Of Negroes As Personal Property . . . . But Being Men, By The Laws Of God And Nature, They Were Capable Of Acquiring Liberty - And When The Captor In War . . . Thought Fit To Give Them Liberty, The Gift Was Not Only Valid, But Irrevocable.

I Never Expect To See A Perfect Work From An Imperfect Man.

The Administration Of Private Justice Between The Citizens Of The Same State, The Supervision Of Agriculture And Of Other Concerns Of A Similar Nature, All Those Things In Short Which Are Proper To Be Provided For By Local Legislation, Can Never Be Desirable Cares Of A General Jurisdiction . . . The Attempt To Exercise These Powers Would Be As Troublesome As It Would Be Nugatory; And The Possession Of Them, For That Reason, Would Contribute Nothing To The Dignity, To The Importance, Or To The Splendour Of The National Government.

There Can Be No Profit In The Making Or Selling Of Things To Be Destroyed In War. Men May Think That They Have Such Profit, But In The End The Profit Will Turn Out To Be A Loss.

Responsibility, In Order To Be Reasonable, Must Be Limited To Objects Within The Power Of The Responsible Party, And In Order To Be Effectual, Must Relate To Operations Of That Power, Of Which A Ready And Proper Judgment Can Be Formed By The Constituents.

There Is Perhaps, Nothing More Likely To Disturb The Tranquillity Of Nations, Than Their Being Bound To Mutual Contributions For Any Common Object That Does Not Yield An Equal And Coincident Benefit. For It Is An Observation As True, As It Is Trite, That There Is Nothing Men Differ So Readily About As The Payment Of Money.

It Will Be Well To Advert To The Proportion Between The Objects That Will Require A Federal Provision In Respect To Revenue; And Those Which Will Require A State Provision. We Shall Discover That The Former Are Altogether Unlimited; And That The Latter Are Circumscribed Within Very Moderate Bounds.

It Is Presumable That No Country Will Be Able To Borrow Of Foreigners Upon Better Terms Than The United States, Because None Can, Perhaps, Afford So Good Security.

Those Who Have A Tolerable Knowledge Of Human Nature Will Not Stand In Need Of Such Lights.

[a] Power Equal To Every Possible Contingency Must Exist Somewhere In The Government . . .

A Feeble Executive Implies A Feeble Execution Of The Government. A Feeble Execution Is But Another Phrase For A Bad Execution; And A Government Ill Executed, Whatever May Be Its Theory, Must Be, In Practice, A Bad Government.

As The Duties Of Superintending The National Defense And Of Securing The Public Peace Against Foreign Or Domestic Violence Involve A Provision For Casualties And Dangers To Which No Possible Limits Can Be Assigned, The Power Of Making That Provision Ought To Know No Other Bounds Than The Exigencies Of The Nation And The Resources Of The Community.

Domestic Violence

. . . [the Judicial Branch] May Truly Be Said To Have Neither Force Nor Will, But Merely Judgment; And Must Ultimately Depend Upon The Aid Of The Executive Arm Even For The Efficacy Of Its Judgments.

A Republic Of This Kind, Able To Withstand An External Force, May Support Itself Without Any Internal Corruptions. The Form Of This Society Prevents All Manner Of Inconveniences.

[h]owever Weak Our Country May Be, I Hope We Shall Never Sacrifice Our Liberties.

Nothing Could Be More Ill-judged Than That Intolerant Spirit Which Has, At All Times, Characterized Political Parties.

[t]he Present Constitution Is The Standard To Which We Are To Cling. Under Its Banners, Bona Fide Must We Combat Our Political Foes - Rejecting All Changes But Through The Channel Itself Provides For Amendments.

Experience Is The Oracle Of Truth; And Where Its Responses Are Unequivocal, They Ought To Be Conclusive And Sacred.

You Should Not Have Taken Advantage Of My Sensibility To Steal Into My Affections Without My Consent.

It Is Of The Greatest Consequence That The Debt Should, With The Consent Of The Creditors, Be Remoulded Into Such A Shape As Will Bring The Expenditure Of The Nation To A Level With Its Income. Till This Shall Be Accomplished, The Finances Of The United States Will Never Wear A Proper Countenance. Arrears Of Interest, Continually Accruing, Will Be As Continual A Monument, Either Of Inability, Or Of Ill Faith And Will Not Cease To Have An Evil Influence On Public Credit.

The Convention Probably Foresaw What It Has Been A Principal Aim Of These Papers To Inculcate That The Danger Which Most Threatens Our Political Welfare Is, That The State Governments Will Finally Sap The Foundations Of The Union.

Necessity, Especially In Politics, Often Occasions False Hopes, False Reasonings, And A System Of Measures, Correspondingly Erroneous.

Hitherto My Observations Have Only Aimed At A Vindication Of The Provision In Question, On The Ground Of Theoretic Propriety . . . . But There Remains To Be Mentioned A Positive Advantage . . . I Allude To The Circumstance Of Uniformity In The Time Of Elections For The House Of Representatives. It Is More Than Possible, That This Uniformity May Be Found By Experience To Be Of Great Importance To The Public Welfare; Both As A Security Against The Perpetuation Of The Same Spirit In The Body; And As A Cure For The Diseases Of Faction.

It Is Astonishing That So Simple A Truth Should Ever Have Had An Adversary; And It Is One Among A Multitude Of Proofs, How Apt A Spirit Of Ill-informed Jealousy, Or Of Too Great Abstraction And Refinement Is To Lead Men Astray From The Plainest Paths Of Reason And Conviction.

The Reasonableness Of The Agency Of The National Courts In Cases In Which The State Tribunals Cannot Be Supposed To Be Impartial, Speaks For Itself. No Man Ought Certainly To Be A Judge In His Own Cause, Or In Any Cause In Respect To Which He Has The Least Interest Or Bias.

The Circumstances That Endanger The Safety Of Nations Are Infinite, And For This Reason No Constitutional Shackles Can Wisely Be Imposed On The Power To Which The Care Of It Is Committed.

Manufacturing Establishments Not Only Occasion A Positive Augmentation Of The Produce And Revenue Of The Society . . . They Contribute Essentially To Rendering Them Greater Than They Could Possibly Be, Without Such Establishments. These Circumstances Are . . . Greater Scope For The Diversity Of Talents And Dispositions Which Discriminate Men From Each Other.

This Balance Between The National And State Governments Ought To Be Dwelt On With Peculiar Attention, As It Is Of The Utmost Importance. It Forms A Double Security To The People. If One Encroaches On Their Rights They Will Find A Powerful Protection In The Other. Indeed, They Will Both Be Prevented From Overpassing Their Constitutional Limits By A Certain Rivalship, Which Will Ever Subsist Between Them.

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